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PROLOGUE
Here is a too-easy torts final exam question:
An aircraft, negligently maintained by its operator, crashes on takeoff.
The operator and her passenger are killed. In addition, the plane strikes
and causes $250,000 of damage to a zoo that is a local tourist attraction.
For which of the following is the operator’s estate liable in tort?
• The amounts claimed by eligible persons for the wrongful
death of the passenger;
• The damage to the zoo;
• The cost of a babysitter hired by the sister of the passenger to
care for the sister’s toddler while the sister attends the
passenger’s funeral;
• The loss (represented by the time value of money for the
period between the untimely accident and the passenger’s
actuarial life span) to the insurance company that paid the
proceeds of the passenger’s life insurance policy to its
designated beneficiaries;
• The cost of overtime pay by the county to the police officers
it directed to control traffic around the crash scene;
• The interest costs borne by the factory worker who had to
borrow money after being laid off when the factory that had
employed him shut down. The factory had shut down
because it could no longer afford to pay increased property
taxes, which the city had imposed to compensate for the loss
of other tax revenue resulting from the decline in tourism that
followed the closure of the zoo.
If you answered that the negligent aircraft operator is liable for all of
these damages, stop. Return to the classroom. Do not collect your law
degree, for clearly you missed the duty, causation, and damages segments
of your torts course.1

1. Only the first two types of damage are recoverable in tort. The third type of
damage is excluded if the sister is not named in the state’s wrongful death statute.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 30, 1998, New Orleans became the first city in the nation
to file suit against the firearm industry.2 Chicago followed two weeks
later.3 Within eighteen months, thirty cities and counties had sued over
forty gun manufacturers, dealers, and trade associations.4 Most of these
plaintiffs contend that the defendants’ firearms are defective and “unreasonably
dangerous” products as then manufactured and marketed.5 The governments
demanded damages for harms allegedly caused by those defective and
unreasonably dangerous products. So far, so good: these claims, however
persuasive, at least respect the basic principles of product liability law.6
They allege that the defendants acted wrongfully,7 and they demand
compensation for harm proximately caused by this wrongdoing.
Alas, the prima facie validity of the firearm suits ends here, for
governments are not claiming that their property was destroyed or
damaged by exploding, defective guns. Rather, the gist of these suits is
a demand for recovery of costs that plaintiffs incurred to treat uninsured
gunshot victims in city hospitals, to pay for police and 911 employee
overtime, to compensate for lost tax revenue as property values
dropped in violence-infested neighborhoods, and the like.8 As has
been documented elsewhere, these suits have been almost universally

2. See Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 2 (La. 2001).
3. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1106 (Ill. 2004).
4. Bill Miller, District Suing the Gun Industry: Damages Sought for City’s
Carnage, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2000, at A1 (reporting that Washington, D.C. was the
thirtieth local government to file a lawsuit against the gun industry). The other
governments include: Atlanta; Boston; Bridgeport, Conn.; Camden, N.J.; Camden
County, N.J.; Chicago; Cincinnati; Cleveland; Detroit; Gary, Ind.; Los Angeles; Los
Angeles County; Miami-Dade County; New Orleans; Newark, N.J.; San Francisco; St.
Louis; Wayne County, Mich.; and Wilmington, Del. Jurist Legal News & Research,
Gun Laws, Gun Control & Gun Rights Current Cases, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/gunlaw.
htm (providing links to the thirty complaints) (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
5. See, e.g., Morial, 785 So. 2d at 6; Jurist Legal News & Research, Gun Laws,
Gun Control & Gun Rights Current Cases, supra note 4.
6. See MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
7. This Article accepts, without discussing or in any way relying on, the position
that product liability is based on wrongful behavior, even though most courts purport to
base it on strict liability. See, e.g., William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in
Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REV. 777, 779 (1983) (“[T]he concept of fault is embedded
in the structure of strict products liability law itself.”).
8. See, e.g, Complaint at 12, Bridgeport v. Smith & Wesson, No. CV99-036-1279
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 1999).
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unsuccessful,9 for they spurn three necessary conditions of a valid tort
suit: they fail to prove breach of a duty of care, they fail to establish
proximate causation, and they invoke noncognizable damages.10
Some who would hold firearms manufacturers liable for expenses
incurred by governments after the criminal use of guns take issue with
the claim that the government services for which compensation is
claimed are ineligible for tort recovery. They argue that government
services should not “subsidize” tortfeasors, and that proper accounting
requires tortfeasors to internalize social costs of their alleged misbehavior.11
They would do away with what they term the “free public services
doctrine” (FPSD),12 which one author described as holding that “a
government entity may not recover from a tortfeasor the costs of public
services occasioned by the tortfeasor’s wrongdoing.”13 Why should
taxpayers pay to direct traffic after a collision caused by a drunk driver?
Why should the drunk (and his insurance company) not be charged the
cost of the public ambulance used to transport victims to the hospital, or
the fire engine used to douse the flames created by the drunk driver’s car
collision with a gas pump?14 Why should the drunk be able to externalize
all this harm?
9. One suit has thus far survived summary judgment. The court in City of
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. held that “a public-nuisance action can be maintained
for injuries caused by a product if the facts establish that the design, manufacturing,
marketing, or sale of the product unreasonably interferes with a right common to the
general public.” 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ohio 2002). The case has not yet gone back to
the trial court.
10. MICHAEL I. KRAUSS, FIRE AND SMOKE: GOVERNMENT LAWSUITS AND THE RULE
OF LAW 9, 11-12 (2000).
11. See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Should Government Be Allowed to Recover the
Costs of Public Services from Tortfeasors? Tort Subsidies, the Limits of Loss Spreading,
and the Free Public Services Doctrine, 76 TUL. L. REV. 727 (2002); see also Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1019 (2001); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Risks of and Reactions to
Underdeterrence in Torts, 70 MO. L. REV. 691 (2005); Raymond E. Gangarosa et al.,
Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for the Treatment of Disease, Injury
and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 81 (1994); Laura
L. Gavioli, Who Should Pay: Obstacles to Cities in Using Affirmative Litigation as a
Source of Revenue, 78 TUL. L. REV. 941 (2004); David C. McIntyre, Note, Tortfeasor
Liability for Disaster Response Costs: Accounting for the True Cost of Accidents, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 1001 (1987).
12. Lytton, supra note 11, at 727.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Keith Stone, Conference Airs ‘Bright Ideas’ for a Better L.A., DAILY
NEWS OF L.A., Nov. 17, 1996, at N3 (reporting that an attorney at a conference argued
Los Angeles should charge drunk drivers for the time and expense of their cases, so that
the city can recoup some of its costs); Kelly J. Wilding, Miscellaneous, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 11, 1999, at E7 (reporting that the Pittsburgh city council voted to
adopt an ordinance permitting service companies and borough officials to recoup
expenses for fire, police, and emergency services from reckless people who cause
accidents, including drunk drivers).
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It is obvious to advocates of cost recoupment suits against gun
manufacturers that the stakes in the FPSD debate are high. One critic
recently edited a collection of articles on suing the gun industry, in
which he asserts that FPSD has been accepted as a “well-established
principle of common law” in some states but “dismissed . . . as without
precedent” in others.15 This implies that the common law is currently
confused about the doctrine. On the other side of the political spectrum,
proponents of federal tort reform have sought to specifically immunize
gun manufacturers from recoupment suits.16 Of course, such legislation,
if enacted, would imply that the recoupment suits might have been valid
in the statute’s absence.17
This Article contends that both camps would benefit from a thorough
understanding of FPSD’s place within the common law of tort.
According to an FPSD critic, for instance, only ten states and a few
federal courts follow FPSD.18 But as the Prologue’s “exam question”
suggests, FPSD is in reality an illustration of universal and fundamental
common law tort concepts: duty, proximate cause, and damages.
Wherever these elements remain requirements for common law liability,
public service cost recoupment should be denied.19
15. Timothy D. Lytton, Introduction to SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 15 (Timothy D.
Lytton ed. 2005).
16. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, S. 659, 108th Cong. (2003) (“To
prohibit civil liability actions from being brought or continued against manufacturers,
distributors, dealers, or importers of firearms or ammunition for damages resulting from
the misuse of their products by others”); Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act,
H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003).
17. A statute that is comprehensive indicates a legislative intent that the statute
totally supersedes and replaces the common law dealing with the subject matter.
NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50:05 (6th ed. 2005);
see also Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 789 (1952) (holding that a
comprehensive statute describing course of conduct, parties, things affected, limitations,
and exceptions excludes all aspects of the common law not specified by Congress in the
statute).
18. Lytton cites cases for the following states: Alaska, California, Florida, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Lytton,
supra note 11, at 728-29 n.2. He also discusses what he deems the “mixed” acceptance
of the doctrine in federal courts. Id. at 729 n.3.
19. This is why the list of jurisdictions that do not accept FPSD is far more
extensive than the list of jurisdictions that actually mention the doctrine by name. For
example, proximate cause was invoked in Georgia in Torres v. Putnam County, 541
S.E.2d 133, 136 & n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (dismissing suit against defendants for the
cost of sending county building inspector, sheriff, and deputy sheriff to inspect
defendants’ land for zoning violations). Cf. City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801
N.E.2d 1222, 1240 (Ind. 2003) (noting that the doctrines of remoteness and proximate
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Abolishing FPSD could permit the government to recover the cost of
many services it currently provides, from firefighting costs due to careless
smokers to the costs of special education required by children born with
preventable medical problems.20 As this Article shows, FPSD’s opponents
unjustifiably confine their recoupment demands to expenditures made
where the target defendant is a corporation. Their proposed modification of
FPSD is, in reality, a means to further their agenda of regulation by
litigation.21
FPSD’s opponents find the justifications offered in defense of the
doctrine to be weak and circular.22 They challenge FPSD as unfair and
inefficient, and claim that FPSD springs from judicial activism that
distorts common law and usurps legislatures’ policymaking prerogatives.23
If these critics are correct, trial attorneys and judicial and economic
conservatives should unite to condemn FPSD.
But this Article argues that FPSD does not distort tort law. FPSD is in
fact an embodiment of the common law of torts; ridding tort of FPSD
would be legislating from the bench. Abolishing FPSD inside the common
law would require defiling fundamental tort doctrines. Deploying
governmental rescue services to mitigate the effects of misbehavior does
not constitute damages proximately caused by that misbehavior. Moreover,
no one owes a duty to governments to refrain from utilizing government
cause may apply to the city’s public nuisance claim against a firearm manufacturer).
Lytton believes proximate cause analysis is often different from the free public services
doctrine. Lytton, supra note 11, at 748-49.
20. For an example of the expense of special education, see BARRY WERTH,
DAMAGES 159 (1998) (estimating cost of private school special education for a braindamaged child as $47,748 per year for sixteen years).
21. Lytton, for example, has written extensively elsewhere in favor of the use of
municipal and individual suits against gun manufacturers and dealers as a way to
augment government regulation of the industry. Timothy D. Lytton, The Complementary
Role of Tort Litigation in Regulating the Gun Industry, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY,
supra note 15, at 250; Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A
Comparative Institutional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247 (2000); Timothy D. Lytton,
Negligent Marketing: Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent
Marketing Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 681 (1998);
Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injuries:
Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65
MO. L. REV. 1 (2000). Galligan approves of recoupment suits against firearms and
tobacco manufacturers because they will “equalize[] the relative strength of the parties.
The suit is one powerful entity—a governmental entity—against another, a large entity
or group of entities. . . . [I]t is large versus large.” Galligan, Deterrence: The Legitimate
Function of the Public Tort, supra note 11, at 1049.
22. See, e.g., Lytton, supra note 11, at 752 (“The few opinions that give
justifications provide little more than merely the outlines of an adequate defense of
[FPSD], and they suffer from question-begging . . . . [S]urveying the case law reveals
that in imposing the doctrine, courts have failed to offer any convincing justification for
it.”).
23. Id. at 731, 759, 765.

6

KRAUSS.DOC

[VOL. 44: 1, 2007]

6/5/2007 1:39:30 PM

Public Services Meet Private Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

services, except conceivably to refrain from maliciously calling upon
them.24 Therefore, any alleged overuse of government services is not
damage proximately caused by wrongdoing.
This Article defends FPSD by describing four flaws that undermine
the anti-FPSD thesis. Part II details FPSD critics’ most blatant failing: a
defective analysis of current law. This faulty analysis leads FPSD’s critics
to suggest a reform that would in fact render tort law incoherent. Part III
discusses FPSD critics’ failure to acknowledge why government services
are not of the “fee for service” variety, arguing that the essence of certain
community services is their provision without charge. This Part also rebuts
the critics’ claims that FPSD underdeters corporations from committing
negligent acts, and that FPSD is an instance of judicial activism. Part IV
unmasks the underlying issue that permeates the anti-FPSD thesis: a
pervasive distrust of corporations. The Article concludes by summarizing
the claim that FPSD must be retained as an essential component of the
common law of tort, unless and until tort is superseded by public
ordering.25
II. FPSD AND TORT DOCTRINE
Tort liability for negligence requires that a plaintiff allege and produce
persuasive evidence of: (a) the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff; (b) the
defendant’s breach of this duty; (c) the proximate and legal causation of
the plaintiff’s loss from this breach; and (d) the cognizable damages
arising from this loss.26 But tortfeasors do not owe any legal duty to the
providers of government services. Likewise, the discharge of government
24. Thus, prank false alarm phone calls to the fire department would arguably be
fraudulent and tortious under common law. Courts have allowed suits by emergency
workers injured in accidents on the way to answer emergency calls that are later found to
be false alarms. See, e.g., Duncan v. Rzonca, 478 N.E.2d 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (city
police officer injured on way to answer silent robbery alarm at bank set off by
negligently supervised child); Daas v. Pearson, 319 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971)
(city police officer injured on way to answer intentional false alarm). There is no
obvious reason why municipalities could not similarly recover from plaintiffs for
damage to city vehicles involved in such accidents. Further, many municipalities make
it a crime to falsely summon emergency workers. Such statutes may be used to aid in
determining the standard of care required of citizens. E.g., Daas, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 54041.
25. See Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
623 (1991).
26. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th
ed. 1984).
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services does not constitute proximately caused compensable damages.
FPSD, it turns out, does little more than give a name to an instantiation
of basic doctrines of tort.
A. Duty
In County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance,27 the California
Court of Appeal explained the common law doctrine of duty: “Whether
intentional or negligent, a tort ‘involves a violation of a legal duty,
imposed by statute, contract or otherwise, owed by the defendant to the
person injured. Without such a duty, any injury is “damnum absque
injuria”—injury without wrong.’”28 The court was commenting on legal
duty generally, not in specific relation to FPSD.29 But a duty analysis
applies fully even when used to deny tortfeasor liability for a byproduct
of a free public rescue service. This has classically been the case under
the longstanding “firefighter’s rule.”30 Dating back to 1892, the firefighter’s
rule precludes a rescue worker from recovering in tort from a negligent
landowner, where the rescue worker was injured while attending to an
emergency created by a landowner’s negligence.31 The original rationale
for the rule against recovery was arguably based on property law,32 but
today the firefighter’s rule is often seen as one of the surviving instances
of the doctrine of assumption of risk.33 Like FPSD, the firefighter’s rule
is said to bar recovery because the person who negligently caused the
blaze owed no duty to the firefighter. The proximate cause of the
firefighter’s injury was not the negligent landowner, but the firefighter’s
own voluntary decision to do the job.
The similarity between the firefighter’s rule and FPSD can be seen in
Mayor of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., where both played a
role.34 In this case, two corporations were allegedly responsible for an
explosion and ensuing fire at a fuel plant in Morgan City, Louisiana; the
27. 223 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Ct. App. 1986).
28. Id. at 855 (citations omitted).
29. The court did, however, discuss the doctrine. Id. at 850-51. After discussing
Flagstaff and Air Florida, the court held that “a government entity may not, as the
County seeks to do in this case, recover the costs of law enforcement absent authorizing
legislation.” Id. at 851. Thereafter, the court determined there was no statute authorizing
such recovery. Id. at 851-53.
30. The rule also applies to police officers. See David L. Strauss, Comment,
Where There’s Smoke, There’s the Firefighter’s Rule: Containing the Conflagration
After One Hundred Years, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 2031, 2031 (1992).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2034. Courts originally considered firemen’s liability under the “traditional
classifications of entrants upon premises—licensees, invitees, and trespassers.” Firefighters
were licensees, not subject to the more strenuous duties owed to invitees. Id.
33. See id. at 2035.
34. 460 So. 2d 685 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
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city sued both corporations to recoup the cost of fighting the fire.35 In
affirming the lower court’s denial of recovery, the Louisiana Court of
Appeal stated:
We deem it unreasonable to hold that an owner owes it to firefighters not to let
his building catch fire. To the contrary: it is the firefighters’ duty to the
property owners (and neighbors) to save them from their negligence. . . .
....
. . . By assuming the responsibility of providing for such “rescue” services, the
City has placed itself in a situation analogous to that of the professional
rescuer.36

As Fontenot demonstrates, the government’s self-imposed duty to
provide rescue services without later suing for compensation, and the
negligent citizen’s lack of duty to refrain from non-maliciously using
government services, are two sides of the same coin. However, Professors
Lytton and Galligan dispute the relevance of this duty analysis to FPSD.
According to Galligan, “[t]he argument that public entities exist to
provide public services is a confusing response. So what? Public services
traceable to a defendant’s torts ought to be recoverable in order to
encourage efficient investments in safety.”37 Lytton excoriates Fontenot
as question-begging:
According to the court, the government cannot recover the costs of public
service expenditures from tortfeasors because tortfeasors owe the government
no duty of care to prevent such losses. Tortfeasors owe no duty because the
government, like a professional rescuer, assumes the risk of losses incurred
while providing services to tort victims. The government can be said to assume
this risk because such losses are inherent in the government’s duty to provide
public services. That is, the government is under a duty to provide public
services free of charge. Thus, the government cannot recover the costs of
public services from tortfeasors because they are under a duty to provide such
services free of charge. The Fontenot court’s duty analysis ultimately amounts
to a restatement, rather than a justification, of the free public services doctrine:
the government cannot recover public service costs from tortfeasors because it
is under a duty not to.38

Professor Lytton is of course correct to assert that common law courts
normally repeat fundamental rules rather than offer independent philosophical
groundings for them. This is known as applying established precedent.
35. Id. at 686.
36. Id. at 687-88 (quoting Thompson v. Warehouse Corp. of Am., 337 So. 2d 572,
573 (La. Ct. App. 1976)).
37. Galligan, Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, supra note
11, at 1045-46.
38. Lytton, supra note 11, at 754 (footnotes omitted).
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But applying preexisting rules is only question-begging in the sense that
the rule of law itself is question-begging. The invocation of a precedent
assumes the legitimacy of a legal rule instead of constantly reestablishing
it.39
Consider the substantive question, then. The common law precludes
recovery for free public service expenses, but why? Are governments
precluded from recovering because their expenses were in fulfillment of
their own duty to provide rescue services? Is recovery precluded because
the tortfeasor owes no duty to the government providing the service? Is
there really a difference in this distinction, or are these two ways of
phrasing the same idea?
1. Government’s Duty to Rescue
In 1987, FPSD opponent David McIntyre discussed the importance of
duty in FPSD.40 In McIntyre’s opinion, the “primary rationale” behind
the general rule against municipal cost recovery is the assertion of a selfimposed “preexisting duty” of government to act.41 Courts have held
that recovery of the costs of rescue from a negligent corporation whose
tort led to an increase in such costs is precluded because government
fulfilled a “governmental function” by providing rescue services.42 In
effect, governments assign themselves duties to rescue according to the
services they have established. It is a government’s statutory selfimposition of this responsibility, not the tortfeasor’s common law duty
to his direct victim, that is the legal source of costs incurred by the
government. Indeed, in City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,43 the
Ohio Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that “the
39. Indeed, Lytton presents his own question-begging argument: governments
should recoup public services from corporations because . . . well, because Lytton thinks
they should.
40. See McIntyre, supra note 11.
41. Id. at 1009. Courts have held that there is no positive constitutional right to
government-supplied rescue services. Governments are free to decline to provide such
services. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (“As a general
matter, the State is under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those
within its border.”); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
city’s failure to send an emergency squad to a resident in physical distress who called for
help does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of Equal Protection and
Due Process).
42. See McIntyre, supra note 11, at 1008-09 nn.44-45.
43. Appeal Nos. C-990729, C-990814, C-990815, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3601, at
*1 (Ct. App. 2000), rev’d, 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002). The Ohio Supreme Court, on
appeal, confirmed that as a general rule “a municipality cannot reasonably expect to
recover the costs of services whenever a tortfeasor causes harm to the public, [but] it
should be allowed to argue that it may recover such damages in this type of case.” City
of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1149 (Ohio 2002) (creating an
exception for “ongoing and persistent” misconduct).
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city may not recover for expenditures for ordinary public services which
it has the duty to provide.”44 Similarly, in 2001 the Connecticut Supreme
Court upheld dismissal of the City of Bridgeport’s suit against firearm
manufacturers because the city, having provided public services as part
of its normal civic function, lacked “any statutory authorization to
initiate . . . claims” of liability against the firearms industry.45
2. Tortfeasor’s Lack of Duty to Government
Courts have also rejected government attempts to recover the cost of
public service occasioned by a tortfeasor’s negligence on the grounds
that the tortfeasor owed no preexisting legal duty to government. For
instance, in Fontenot, the city spent $38,000 on fire and police services
to extinguish a fire caused by a corporation’s alleged mishandling of
combustible chemicals.46 In denying the city recovery for the cost of
these services, the court declared that any duty Fontenot, Inc. owed in
handling its flammable chemicals “does not include within the ambit of
its protection the risk that public . . . funds will be expended to fight a
fire . . . .”47
In County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance,48 defendants
intentionally, though not maliciously, committed acts of trespass that
they in fact hoped would result in the expenditure of police resources;
yet even they were not held liable for those expenditures. The court
rejected the county’s attempt to recover money spent for police overtime
and related costs arising from defendant protest groups’ occupation of a
construction site for a nuclear power plant.49 A fortiori, the same result
surely must ensue when a public expenditure is neither foreseen nor
desired. Hiking alone on the Appalachian Trail in the wintertime may
be foolhardy, and perhaps even a dereliction of one’s moral obligations
to one’s dependents and employer, but it is assuredly not a legal breach
of any common law duty to the Park Service’s mountain rescue squad.

44. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3601, at *38.
45. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. X06 CV 990153198S, 1999 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 3330, at *4 (Dec. 10, 1999), aff’d, 780 A.2d 98, 108 (Conn. 2001).
46. See Mayor of Morgan City v. Jessie J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685, 686 (La.
Ct. App. 1987).
47. Id. at 688.
48. 223 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Ct. App. 1986).
49. Id. at 849-51 (“[A] government entity may not, as the County seeks to do in
this case, recover the costs of law enforcement absent authorizing legislation.”).
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In State v. Long Island Lighting Co., the court dismissed a state’s
action to recover costs incurred to direct traffic when defendant’s power
lines allegedly negligently fell onto a roadway, even though defendant
arguably did breach a duty to the state.50 Unlike other FPSD cases, here
the state’s own property had been obstructed as a result of the allegedly
wrongful behavior, making the government’s tort case much stronger
than for the firearm suits. Notwithstanding this distinction, the court
dismissed the recoupment suit: “The plaintiff may not recover damages
for undertaking its duty to ensure the safety of the traveling public. . . .
Plaintiffs performed the very tasks intended by the Legislature. They
exercised their functions, powers and duties relating to traffic regulation
and control.”51 For the court, the source of the plaintiff’s expenditures
was its voluntarily assumed statutory duty to ensure the flow of traffic,
not the damage to its own property by the defendant.
Where a tortfeasor negligently damages (not merely obstructs)
government property, courts generally permit recovery for the harm to
the property, even though recoupment is not allowed for rescue and
cleanup efforts.52 In District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., a government
sued an airline to recover expenditures incurred to rescue the injured,
recover the bodies of the dead, and raise the wreckage of a jet that had
crashed into Washington’s 14th Street Bridge on takeoff from National
Airport.53 Air Florida certainly owed a duty to its passengers and to
persons on the ground not to negligently injure them or damage their
property, and the airline also owed a duty to the District of Columbia not
to negligently damage the 14th Street Bridge. However, the airline
owed no duty to the District’s fire department to refrain from prompting
use of its emergency services. Rather, the fire department itself created
and assumed a duty, which did not exist at common law, to help both
Air Florida and stricken passengers and motorists. The airline agreed to
pay the state for damage to the bridge,54 but the lawsuit against the
airline for recovery of the cost of rescue services was dismissed.55

50. 493 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256, 259 (N.Y.Co. Ct. 1985).
51. Id. at 257 (brackets omitted).
52. Lytton discusses the exception for damage to public property at Lytton, supra
note 11, at 743. McIntyre discusses the exception at McIntyre, supra note 11, at 1025.
53. 750 F.2d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 1079 n.1.
55. A District of Columbia United States District Court dismissed the city’s suit
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1078.
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3. Subrogatory Theory of Duty
In an effort to forestall the common law’s inevitable duty analysis,
David McIntyre posits an agency theory that bypasses the traditional
notion of duty.
[T]here is no reason why a municipality’s financial interests should not be
entitled to legal protection, particularly since it is suing on behalf of its
taxpayers to whom the money ultimately belongs. . . .
....
. . . [I]n a disaster situation a duty of reasonable care is owed the public at large
which, in essence, is represented by the government plaintiff in a response cost
recovery action.56

Professor Lytton uncritically paraphrases McIntyre’s arguments: “Taxpayers
lose when they pay to replenish public resources depleted by the
tortfeasor, and the public at large loses whenever those resources are no
longer available for other purposes. In this regard, government is analogous
to a corporation, whose losses ultimately harm shareholders.”57
Under McIntyre’s agency theory, provision of government services is
analogous to insurers’ indemnification of insureds, allowing insurers de
jure subrogation rights against the party that injured their insureds in
some cases. There are two problems with this argument, however. First,
subrogation requires that the party suing stand in the shoes of the actual
victim;58 subrogation may be invoked only if the victim herself has a
56. McIntyre, supra note 11, at 1011, 1020 (emphasis added). Note that Erich
Rolf Luschei analyzes City of Flagstaff under a similar approach, arguing that the city
government should have been compensated (although under a theory of unjust
enrichment, rather than in tort) for assuming the railroad’s duty to rescue residents put in
danger by the railroad’s dangerous chemicals. See Erich Rolf Luschei, Comment,
Government Recovery of Emergency Service Expenditures: An Analysis of User Charges, 19
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 971, 984 (1986).
57. Lytton, supra note 11, at 760. Presumably Lytton is only concerned with
corporate tortfeasors, for reasons made clear infra at notes 163-92 and accompanying
text.
58. See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Courtaulds Performance Films, Inc., 580
S.E.2d 812, 815 (Va. 2003) (“Subrogation is, in its simplest terms, the substitution of one
party in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand, or right so that the
party that is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other.”); Fed. Land Bank of
Baltimore v. Joynes, 18 S.E.2d 917, 920 (Va. 1942) (“Subrogation is the substitution of
another person in the place of the creditor to whose rights he succeeds in relation to the
debt.”); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Whaley, 3 S.E.2d 395, 396 (Va. 1939) (noting that, in
equity, a debt paid by a surety “is treated as still subsisting and the surety stands in the
shoes of the creditor, entitled to the same rights the creditor was entitled to”).
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legal claim against the tortfeasor that can be assigned to the insurer, or
here, the government.59 This is a questionable proposition in the case of
disaster responses.60 Second, if citizens do have individual causes of
action against a tortfeasor, their right to sue must be assigned to the
government.61 But no individual or statutory rights transfer occurred in
the municipal cost recovery cases, nor were government plaintiffs
merely seeking reimbursement for losses incurred by citizens.62
Professor Lytton concedes that the “insurance collective” analogy is
unsustainable.63 He states that “[i]t would be a mistake to view efforts
by government entities to recover public service expenditures as
subrogation actions,” because no assignment of the public’s rights has
been made to government, and because “government entities sue in their
own right for their own losses, which are distinguishable from the losses
of their citizens.”64 Likewise, Galligan praises the “tactical brilliance”
behind firearms and tobacco recoupment suits because they allegedly
“avoid[] the difficulties inherent in subrogation claims,” including issues
of contributory and comparative negligence and assumption of risk, all
of which may be invoked against a subrogated plaintiff.65 But without a
subrogatory basis for their causes of action, anti-FPSD supporters are
left where they started: simply no duty is owed by a tortfeasor to the fire
department to minimize use of its service. In a somewhat astonishing
aside, Professor Lytton appears to concede all this. He grants that
59. It is worth noting the general rule that claims for personal torts are not
assignable. See City of Richmond v. Hanes, 122 S.E.2d 895, 898 (Va. 1961):
The general doctrine, both at law and in equity, is that rights of action for torts
causing injuries which are strictly personal and which do not survive are not
capable of being assigned . . . . The rule was based on principles of public
policy to discourage champerty and maintenance.
Id. (citations omitted).
60. Cf. Am. Liberty Ins. Co. v. AmSouth Bank, 825 So. 2d 786, 790 (Ala. 2002)
(noting it has been long recognized in Alabama that “a surety who pays the debt of his
principal ‘stands in the shoes’ of the payee and may enforce the payee’s rights in order to
seek reimbursement”); Sundheim v. Sch. Dist., 166 A. 365, 369 (Pa. 1933) (noting that a
party seeking to enforce subrogation “must point to some equitable right through the
persons in whose shoes it stands”).
61. Trevino v. HHL Fin. Servs., Inc., 945 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Colo. 1997)
(“Subrogation is a contractual or statutory right pursuant to which a portion of an injured
plaintiff’s rights against the tortfeasor responsible for the injuries are assigned to the
subrogee.”).
62. For a similar discussion of the legal flaws in municipal lawsuits against the
gun industry, see Michael I. Krauss, Regulation Masquerading as Judgment: Chaos
Masquerading as Tort Law, 71 MISS. L.J. 631, 640 (2001).
63. Lytton, supra note 11, at 751.
64. Id. Lytton does not explain how this can be consistent with his comparison of
government as a corporation and citizens as shareholders. Shareholder losses are
presumably equal to their proportionate ownership share of the company’s loss.
65. Galligan, Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, supra note
11, at 1023-24.
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“[d]uty analysis, if properly developed, might well provide support for
the free public services doctrine.”66 But he concludes that “[c]ourts have
failed, however, to offer thoughtful duty analysis when it comes to the
free public services doctrine.”67 Unfortunately for Lytton, a facile charge of
“thoughtlessness” does not a persuasive argument make.
B. Proximate Causation
In the typical municipal case against firearm manufacturers, a third
factor precludes government tort recovery over and above the government’s
voluntary decision to rescue and the tortfeasor’s lack of duty owed to the
government. An intervening intentional tort by one or more third parties
who criminally used the firearm has typically broken any chain of
causation that may have existed between the gun maker’s actions and the
injury. In common law tort, the causal nexus between a plaintiff and a
defendant, once created, does not extend across certain intervening
events, including deliberate human wrongdoing.68 These events interrupt
the chain of causation that began with the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing.69
The traditional doctrine of causal intervention is that “the free, deliberate,
and informed act or omission of a human being, intended to exploit the
situation created by defendant, negatives causal connection.”70 Consistent
with this doctrine, courts have found that an intervening crime by a third
party precludes proximate causation of a plaintiff’s harm as a matter of
law.71
Courts appear to be particularly willing to find a break in the causal
chain if the intentional tort committed by the third party is a violent
crime. For example, in Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co., the court upheld a
66. Lytton, supra note 11, at 754.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88 CAL. L. REV.
827, 827 (2000).
69. Id.
70. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 136 (2d ed. 1985)
(emphasis omitted).
71. See, for example, Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R.R. Co., 126 S.W.
146 (Ky. 1910), in which a tank car full of gasoline derailed due to defendant’s
negligence, resulting in a gas leak. Duerr, a third party, threw a match on the leak, starting a
fire that injured the plaintiff and his house. Defendants presented evidence that Duerr,
who had been discharged by the defendant that morning, intentionally started the fire.
Duerr claimed, however, that he was unaware of the leak and was merely lighting a
match. The court found that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on
proximate cause grounds if the jury found that Duerr acted maliciously. Id. at 151.
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demurrer for tire and car manufacturers in a wrongful death suit where a
motorist was murdered after being stranded when one of her car’s tires
failed.72 The court held that even if the tire was defective and unreasonably
dangerous, it was not the proximate cause of the motorist’s murder by a
third party who encountered her alone in an inoperable vehicle, because
the criminal act by the murderer negated any causal relationship between
the motorist and the manufacturer.73 Similarly, in most cases between a
government and a firearm manufacturer, the criminal use of the firearm
by a third party negates the gun maker’s liability even if the manufacturer
was in some way negligent.
C. Damages
FPSD opponents do not address damages as methodically as duty and
causation,74 but they do consider municipalities to be directly damaged
upon deployment of emergency services in response to negligent corporate
tortfeasors. In fact, according to FPSD opponents, government damages
are more intensely suffered than are private damages, because when
government is a tort victim, we are all victims.
Viewing the government as a tort victim undermines the idea that somehow
public services are free, as the doctrine suggests. The costs of suppressing
negligently started fires or cleaning up oil spills or rescuing airline crash victims
are losses to society as a whole; they drain resources away from other private or
government activities. . . . Allowing government to sue for these losses in tort
shows them to be real costs that someone must bear, not merely free services. If
the tortfeasors whose conduct occasions these costs do not bear them, then all of
us will.75

Under this view, government damages are a straightforward proposition;
one dollar spent by a city fire department to save the property of a
negligent defendant constitutes a dollar’s worth of damage to the city.
After all, that dollar was not free; it has been drained away from other
activities.
There are two problems with this argument. First, negligently caused
economic loss without accompanying physical harm or damage to the
72. 667 N.W.2d 244, 258 (Neb. 2003).
73. Id.
74. Lytton does note that economic damage arguments frequently appear “alongside”
FPSD dicta. See Lytton, supra note 11, at 749. This curious inversion allows Lytton to
mask the fact that the economic damages rule is part of FPSD, not “alongside” it. Lytton
commits the same mistake apropos proximate causation, opining that because of the
proximate causation requirement, “[e]ven in the absence of the free public services
doctrine, most types of law enforcement expenditures would remain unrecoverable.” Id.
at 770. What this misses is that FPSD exists in part because of proximate causation, not
apart from it.
75. Id. at 779.
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plaintiff is generally not recoverable in tort.76 Another difficulty is that
when government services exist solely for emergency and disaster relief,
it is hard to say that use of these services constitutes any damage at all.
This problem was suggested by an economic expert witness for the
defendant oil company in the mammoth Amoco Cadiz case.77 There, the
Seventh Circuit had to consider whether FPSD could protect Amoco
from costs incurred by the French government to clean up an oil spill
Amoco had allegedly negligently caused off the coast of Brittany. The
question was whether some of the claimed damages existed at all:
One could say . . . that there is a difference between proprietary and strictly
governmental operations because the proprietary arms of the government have
other things to do. If the workers of the Electricity Board were not repairing the
lines damaged by the plane, they could be constructing new lines; if the staff of
the phone company were not tracing a freeloader’s calls, they could be hooking
up new phones. But if the sailors of the French Navy were not skimming oil
[from the Cadiz spill], what would they be doing? Invading some neighbor?
On this view governmental operations are different because the opportunity
costs of their employees and equipment are zero. If they were not being used in
the cleanup, they would have no productive use at all.78

Some commentators have conceded that the opportunity cost of
dousing a particular fire is de minimis, and that governments are truly
harmed only when they must supply emergency services above and
beyond a “normal” base level. McIntyre took this position, advocating
liability “only for extraordinary or excessive costs. Common every-day
accidents would not trigger liability because such accidents are within
the zone of risk anticipated by response services.”79 Erich Rolf Luschei
also defended this view in a 1986 article advocating user charges for
tortfeasors who negligently cause “excessive use of the government
service.”80 Luschei explained that limiting recoupment suits to excessive
76. Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American
Tort Law, 46 Supp. AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 112 (1998); see also Robins Dry Dock &
Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308 (1927); Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419, 420-21 (Ga.
1903); Stevenson v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 204 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
77. In re Oil Spill (Amoco Cadiz), 954 F.2d 1279, 1313-14 (7th Cir. 1992).
78. Id. In the end, the Seventh Circuit did not find this argument terribly
persuasive, stating in dicta that the French government most likely took the probability
of such events into account when it decided how many ships to build and how many
sailors were required to staff them. Id. at 1314.
79. McIntyre, supra note 11, at 1018 (footnotes omitted). Because disasters
conceivably could be caused by individuals as well as corporations, McIntyre did not
advocate limiting disaster response recovery lawsuits to corporate tortfeasors. For his
definition of “disasters,” see McIntyre, supra note 11, at 1001 n.10.
80. Luschei, supra note 56, at 993.
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use “serves two purposes. First, it permits some subsidy or cost spreading.
Second, it eliminates the government’s costs of litigation by limiting the
right of action.”81 Under this theory, citizens may be entitled to some
use of public services through the payment of taxes, but excessive use
should incur tort liability to the state.82
Under an excessive expenditure theory, ordinary government rescue
costs such as police and firefighter salaries, or the purchase and maintenance
of standard equipment, would be nonrecoverable damages. Presumably,
some standard level of service for each taxpayer (perhaps one call each
to police and fire departments each year?) would be permitted without
government recoupment of expenses. Above the standard level of
service, however, if wrongdoing underlay the expenditure, costs could
be recouped by the government agency, through either a flat-rate user
fee, an individualized tax bill based on the actual cost of the service, or a
common law tort suit to recoup excess expenditures.83 Alternatively,
government rescue services might be financed much as water service is
billed, by individually calculating fees based on the level of protection
required ex ante for a particular property rather than through indirect
financing methods such as property tax.84 One proposal for funding fire
protection makes fees a function of a formula that includes the property
value, size of the property, number of occupants, and the ex ante probability
of fire.85 In such a system, collective loss-spreading is reduced, but
deterrence is enhanced through discounts for the installation of protective
systems like smoke detectors and sprinklers.86
These mechanics of an excessive expenditure theory have everything
to do with insurance and nothing to do with tort, for under this plan,
actuarially correct ex ante risk, not ex post corrective justice, determines
the premium to be paid by each insured, not the award to be paid by
81. Id.
82. Id. at 974 n.15.
83. Such legal action need not be tort based. Liability might result from abnormal
use of a government service under public ordering, whether fault-based or not. Thus, a
system of fees could be instituted, such as that used in the mid-1990s at Yosemite
National Park to recover the cost of search and rescue missions for hikers and climbers.
In 1996, the Park billed two rock climbers found guilty by a U.S. magistrate of “creating
a hazardous condition” for the cost of their rescue, $13,325. Christopher Reynolds,
Much Talk, Little Action on Charging for Rescues, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1998, at L2.
84. Such proposals are popular with anarcho-capitalists who believe that services
such as fire protection are private rather than public goods. See, e.g., ROBERT W. POOLE,
JR., CUTTING BACK CITY HALL 62 (1980).
85. Id. This proposal was suggested by William Pollack to encourage spending to
shift from fire suppression to fire prevention, and a form of it was adopted by Inglewood,
California in 1978. Id. at 62-63. Private fire insurers originally both fought fires and
paid for damages. See Harry M. Johnson, The History of British and American Fire
Marks, 39 J. RISK & INS. 405, 406 (1972).
86. See POOLE, supra note 84, at 62.
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each defendant, to the municipal government.87 Such proposals bear a
family resemblance to anarcho-capitalistic visions for abolishing government;
private fire insurance carriers originally fought fires and contractually
compensated their clients, with subrogation rights against fire-setters, for
fire damages they did not succeed in preventing.88 But none of this
involves ex post compensation for harm caused by wrongdoing—none
of this sounds in tort.
Despite the disconnect between excessive expenditure theories and
tort doctrine, municipal recoupment suits are nonetheless cast as a means
to replenish government treasuries depleted by extraordinary expenses.
Overtime costs,89 outlays for the acquisition of specialized equipment,90
and supplies purchased for a specific rescue have all been claimed in
tort.91 In City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., the court noted that the city
was claiming a common law right to sue for “excessive use of its fire
department.”92 Likewise, the state in Air Florida asked for “extraordinary
expenses” borne by the District and occasioned by the airline crash.93 In
the litigation following the incident at Pennsylvania’s Three Mile Island
generating plant, the Third Circuit left open the possibility for recovery
of costs incurred by deployment of emergency personnel.94 The district
court had dismissed the case because “[t]he type of damages claimed is
87. Corrective justice posits that resources are transferred from one party to
another in the tort system in order to compensate for damage wrongly inflicted by the
first party on the second party. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW
56-83 (1995); Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of
Tort Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567 (1997).
88. Johnson, supra note 85, at 406. Ironically, proposals like Pollack’s would
transform firefighters into monopoly insurers, turning on its head the anarcho-capitalist
dream.
89. See, e.g., City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d
322, 323 (9th Cir. 1983); Mayor of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d
685, 687 (La. Ct. App. 1984); City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49, 50 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976); Koch v. Consol. Edison Corp., 468 N.E.2d 1, 7-8 (N.Y.
1984).
90. See, e.g., Fontenot, 460 So. 2d at 686; City of Bridgeton, 369 A.2d at 50.
According to McIntyre, District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc. involved the District of
Columbia’s rental of cranes to lift plane wreckage from the Potomac River. McIntyre,
supra note 11, at 1005 & n.27; see District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d
1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
91. Part of the costs Pennsylvania sued to recover in Three Mile Island related
litigation was for emergency supplies. In re TMI Govtl. Entities Claims, 544 F. Supp.
853, 854 (M.D. Pa. 1982), vacated, 710 F.2d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 1985).
92. City of Bridgeton, 369 A.2d at 54 (emphasis added).
93. Air Florida, 750 F.2d at 1079 (emphasis added).
94. Pennsylvania v. Gen. Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 1983).
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similar to that produced by other man-made catastrophes such as fires,
explosions, collapsing structures and the like,”95 but the Third Circuit
held that a jury should decide whether a “nuclear incident” is so exceptional
a hazard that it is not subject to ordinary government services.96
Many commentators have noted the anomaly of governments seeking
common law reimbursement from some tortfeasors for services long
provided without charge to others. In the gun lawsuit filed by Boston,
the court summarized cases applying FPSD in these words:
Fires, fuel spills and ruptured gas mains are all frequent happenings which,
while every effort is made to prevent them, can be expected to occur. Train
derailments and airplane crashes are more unusual, but not so rare that a
municipality can never expect to have to respond to such an emergency. . . .
[S]uch contingencies are part of the normal and expected costs of municipal
existence, and absent legislation providing otherwise are costs to be allocated to
the municipality’s residents through taxes. In addition, in those cases there is no
evidence that the specific defendants had engaged in a repeated course of
conduct causing recurring costs to the municipality.97

In recent years, communities have struggled to discourage excessive
use of public services, but these efforts have not usually taken the form
of recoupment suits. In 1986, the Ventura County, California fire
department weighed whether to fine parents up to $10,000 for wildfires
caused by their children.98 A former chief of the fire department
explained the rationale: “It was felt that it was not fair to the average
taxpayer to bear the brunt of suppression costs of fires that were set
either deliberately or by gross negligence.”99 Apparently, extinguishing
such fires, for the fire department, was “over and above our normal
service.”100 Objecting with what reads as a classic defense of FPSD, the
father of a suspected child arsonist told a reporter, “I feel it’s the [fire]
department’s civic duty [and not mine] to take care of [fires].”101 Of
course, on basic tort principles a negligent or intentional fire setter is
liable in tort for property she destroys, but the issue in Ventura was
whether a parent should be liable for cleanup costs, as opposed to the
value of property burned. Crucial to Ventura County’s position, however,

95. Id. at 121.
96. Id. The issue was never resolved. The parties settled the case without another
trial. McIntyre, supra note 11, at 1032 n.175.
97. City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 1999-02590, 2000 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 352, at *34 (Super. Ct. July 13, 2000).
98. Mack Reed, Parents of Fire Starters Smoldering Over the Bill, L.A. TIMES,
July 12, 1996, at B1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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was the fact that it was authorized by state legislation that superseded
common law.102
Many communities impose regulatory fees for those who overuse
rescue services. Debates over such fees probe the nature of government
service and of community self-help. For example, to cut down on abuse
of the 911 emergency telephone system, the Los Angeles City Council
imposed fees on anyone who called the city fire department for routine
medical treatment.103 A newspaper report noted that “paramedics say
some of the most demanding [911] callers are wage-earning citizens who
complain that they are taxpayers who have a right to city ambulance
service.”104 In 2004, prosperous Fairfax County, Virginia enacted fees
of $300 to $550 for residents requiring the use of emergency ambulance
service.105 Not all citizens thought the new fees were fair; one
complained, “[w]e pay the highest taxes in the [Washington, D.C.] area;
we shouldn’t have to pay for emergency ambulance service.”106
In addition to user fees, quasi-criminal legislation recoups government
costs associated with antisocial behavior. Faced with thousands of calls
for police to check out burglar alarms, in recent years numerous
municipalities have issued citations to citizens whose security systems
repeatedly sound false alarms.107 Virginia law allows localities to charge
for expenses associated with emergency responses to DUI violations and

102. Id. California’s Health & Safety Code section 13009 authorizes actions by
government agencies to recover the costs of fire suppression and emergency services
connected to fighting negligently or illegally set fires. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 13009(a) (Deering 2000).
103. Laurie Becklund, Paramedics Play It Safe—Crews Now Respond to Nearly All
911s, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1991, at A1.
104. Id.
105. Jim McElhatton, Fairfax to Levy Ambulance Fee, WASH. TIMES, May 25,
2004, at B2. The fees would vary based on the level of emergency services required.
Additionally, citizens would be charged $7.50 per mile. Lisa Rein, Fairfax Jobs Program for
Retarded Renewed, WASH. POST, May 25, 2004, at B1. Clearly this was an effort to fund
municipal services through employees’ health insurance plans; it is highly doubtful that
the county would pursue an uninsured taxpayer personally for ambulance services.
Medical insurance is “invisible” (paid for nominally by employers in whole or in part),
while taxes are often all-too visible come election time.
106. Claudette C. Ward, Letter to the Editor, Ambulance Fees Will Be Harmful,
WASH. POST, June 24, 2004, at FS4 (writing in the Fairfax Extra section).
107. See, e.g., Lewis Kamb, Burglar Alarms Cry Wolf—Police Cry Foul: Seattle
Considers Not Responding Unless Calls are Verified, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Sept. 11, 2001, at A1.

21

KRAUSS.DOC

6/5/2007 1:39:30 PM

similar traffic offenses.108 A companion statute allows Virginia localities to
recover expenses incurred in emergency responses to a terrorism hoax.109
Of course, fines are also user fees in some cases, as with “weigh station”
penalties and with many traffic violations, the fines for which may be
seen as a charge for the approximate cost of rescuing those involved in
private misuse of the public highways. But the key characteristic of all
these measures is that they are enacted legislatively. They are regulations of
the state’s relationships with citizens—manifestations of public ordering.110
None of these fines or fees is portrayed as common law tort liability.111
The public debate over user fees shows that these questions are, at their
core, concerned with the fundamental nature of the polity. Many
taxpayers do not view city rescue expenditures as “damage” to a “victim,”
but rather as outlays incurred as a matter of public policy, to be funded
in a fair manner to be determined by the political process after public
debate. Of such policy debates the common law is not made.
III. FPSD AND POLICY
Despite this Article’s efforts to portray tort as a noninstrumental
mechanism of corrective justice without any overarching social goal, the
reader may not be persuaded. Myriad “policy studies” lead some,
especially on the political left, to believe that every legal rule must
conceal a hidden or explicit policy judgment, and that the barrier
between the public and private law components of the law is far from
watertight.112 This Article’s view, controversial but widely held, is that
tort’s sole purpose is to be tort—to establish liability when and only
when duty, breach, causation, and cognizable damages are present.113
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1716 (2003 & Supp. 2005) (originally enacted in 1997).
The statute allows localities to charge a $250 flat fee, or a per-minute fee not to exceed
$1000. Id. Note, however, that routine non-emergency services resulting in a DUI
conviction are not recoverable under the statute, consistent with the statute having carved
out a narrow exception to the common law FPSD. See Counties, Cities, and Towns:
Police and Public Order, Op. Va. Att’y Gen. No. 04-054, 2004 WL 2361387, 2004 Va.
AG LEXIS 41 (Sept. 23, 2004).
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1716.1 (2003 & Supp. 2005) (originally enacted in
2002).
110. See, e.g., Krauss, supra note 25; Krauss, supra note 62 (comparing private
ordering and public ordering).
111. The malicious terrorist phone call comes closest to being a tort, but the
plaintiff would have to be the intended victim, who could sue for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
112. See, e.g., Claire Cutler, Global Capitalism and Liberal Myths: Dispute Settlement
in Private International Trade Relations, 24 MILLENNIUM J. INT’L STUD. 377 (1995)
(arguing for private law as a basis for effecting public policy and rejecting the idea of the
neutrality of private law).
113. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 87, at 145-70.
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This vision of tort buttresses FPSD. But the defense of FPSD need not
solely rely on this foundational argument. Even if policy arguments are
relevant to tort claims, we can dismiss those that undergird the criticism
of FPSD as it pertains to corporate defendants.
A. The Red Herring Called Deterrence
The case against FPSD typically holds that free public services
generate an externality—too much of the harmful behavior that the
public service serves to remedy. Internalizing this externality will, it is
argued, result in optimal deterrence. Taxes, fees, and fines apparently
will not accomplish this adequately, so tort law must take up the slack.
In particular, FPSD critics claim that corporations create a need for
substantial public services, but will not “pay their way” unless we abrogate
FPSD. For example, Luschei maintains that “[c]harging tortfeasors for the
cost of emergency services may reduce the frequency and severity of
tortious behavior.”114 Galligan writes that suits by governments against
tortfeasors play a “key role” in providing “efficient deterrence, as the
legal economist uses that term.”115 McIntyre argues that “tortfeasor
liability for the cost of disaster response services would more accurately
reflect the true cost of accidents than does the present system of
localized taxpayer subsidies.”116
These “economic” arguments fail to take note that corporate tortfeasors
cannot typically direct damage onto municipal services. Corporations
already bear full liability as tortfeasors for harm they negligently or
intentionally cause to persons and property, including government
property. In addition, a corporation internalizes all the harm inflicted on
its own property and business model. Corporate tortfeasors can rarely be
confident that their negligence will require the deployment of, say, the
municipal fire department, without also damaging nearby businesses or
the company’s own facilities, both of which the corporation is presumably
already adequately deterred from harming.117
Negligent defendants typically do not dispute that they are liable for
physical damage to governmental property and for costs incurred to
114. Luschei, supra note 56, at 972.
115. Galligan, Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, supra note
11, at 1020.
116. McIntyre, supra note 11, at 1015.
117. And of course corporate reputation would invariably be affected by wrongdoing,
to the direct detriment of the corporate tortfeasor, absent any tort award.
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protect public and private property from physical damage. Such was the
situation in Amoco Cadiz.118 The Seventh Circuit noted that “[t]he bulk
of the expenses were incurred [by France] in protecting and restoring
public property. Amoco concedes that France is entitled to compensation
for such costs . . . .”119 The primary dispute in Amoco Cadiz was whether
France padded its bill by failing to adequately “separate the costs of
protecting proprietary interests from other expenses . . . .”120 Similarly,
in Air Florida, the D.C. government’s suit to recover public service
expenditures was unsuccessful, but the airline conceded liability for
$70,000 in damage done to D.C.’s 14th Street Bridge.121 And in the
seminal FPSD case, City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., the New
Jersey Superior Court denied recovery for fire department costs to
contain a spill on defendants’ land, but noted that “if the city were the
owner of adjacent land damaged by escaping oil, it like all landowners,
may recover damages caused by this escape.”122
The deterrence argument must be that tort law underdeters corporate
tortfeasors because some fraction of the social cost of their wrongful
behavior is borne by the public weal. However, this claim applies to
virtually every negligent action, by a corporation or an individual, that
has ever been perpetrated since the common law of tort evolved. This is
because negligent behavior results in liability only for proximately
caused harm, thereby externalizing remote “but-for” costs. The deterrence
argument would therefore expunge the notion of proximate causation
from tort law, as economic analysts like Guido Calabresi in fact once
seemed to advocate.123 Tort law’s economic loss doctrine may also be a
culprit. The driver who negligently causes an accident on the George
Washington Bridge during New York City’s rush hour does not owe
compensation to the thousands of commuters who lose pay because their
arrival at work is delayed, or to the employers who lose profit because
their workers are delayed, or to the police departments that incur overtime
expenditures redirecting traffic. Without a revolution in tort, there are

118. In re Oil Spill (Amoco Cadiz), 954 F.2d 1279, 1311 (7th Cir. 1992).
119. Id. at 1310-11.
120. Id. at 1310.
121. District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Al
Kamen, District Agrees to Settlement by Air Florida, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1983, at B8.
Less than two years after the crash occurred, the airline and the plane’s manufacturer
also settled out of court with nearly all of the survivors and victims’ relatives for around
$50 million, in one of the quickest air crash settlements ever. Kenneth Bredermeier, $50
Million Paid in Air Florida Crash Claims, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1983, at A1.
122. 369 A.2d 49, 55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
123. See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975).
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arguably “too many” breakdowns on the George Washington Bridge
during rush hour.
Deterrence-based arguments like these are simply not persuasive to
those who ground tort law on notions of corrective justice, and for whom
proximate causation properly encapsulates the corrective demand.124
But even for economic theories of tort based on “Kaldor-Hicks” wealth
maximization and deterrence,125 the argument against FPSD is vulnerable.126
In any case, FPSD critics do not advance the deterrence argument, for
they do not advocate the general abolition of proximate causation and
the economic loss doctrine. They appear to care only, and peculiarly,
about corporate negligence provoking one kind of remote economic
harm—rescue services. For that narrow subset of remote results of
wrongdoing, the deterrence argument is quite simply unavailable because it
is incoherent.
Looming in the background of this very partial deterrence argument is
a seeming bias against corporations. For example, Lytton argues that
“there is no relation between the tax rates of individuals and corporations
and the costs of the public services that their activities occasion,”
resulting in corporate underinvestment in safety.127 That corporate tax
rates have no intrinsic relation to public service consumption is
incontrovertible. But there is an equally weak link between tax rates of
individuals and the cost of the public services these individuals’ activities
occasion. Do we know whether individuals subsidize corporations on this
account or vice versa, or whether, as seems to me more likely, some
individuals and corporations subsidize other individuals and corporations?
Why, for example, do those opposed to FPSD not channel their concern
with deterrence by addressing the possibility that large numbers of
individuals, for instance, those who decline to evacuate their homes in
the face of an approaching hurricane, systematically underinvest in
safety because they expect government to bail them out? If deterrence is
124. See Krauss, supra note 25, at 625-27; WEINRIB, supra note 87. Galligan
replies, with candor given his revolutionary goals, that “corrective justice . . . is not reflective
of our post-millennium reality.” Galligan, Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the
Public Tort, supra note 11, at 1030.
125. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980). Contra Ronald M.
Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
126. See, e.g., W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1982) (defending tort law’s refusal to grant damages for “economic loss” on deterrence
grounds).
127. Lytton, supra note 11, at 766.
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a primary rationale for abolishing FPSD, should not individuals also be
required to pay for “excessive” emergency services that they use?
Compared to individuals, corporations arguably have a greater desire
to take extra care to guard against public service expenditures due to
their negligence. This is because corporations are more solvent than
individuals, and because corporations, unlike most individuals, have
goodwill that cannot be adequately protected by insurance.128 Indeed,
corporations are more likely to self-insure even for physical damages
proximately caused by their negligence.129 Liability insurance surely
dulls the insured’s incentives,130 but even insured-against harms damage
corporate goodwill. Corporations feel pressure to avoid the negative publicity
that no doubt results from disasters such as the Air Florida crash, the
Cadiz oil spill, or the Three Mile Island incident.131 Individuals’ incentives
to behave non-negligently are arguably much more dulled by insurance,
or by free rescue services, than are corporations’ incentives. Even if
damage from a corporate disaster has been somehow largely confined to
expenditures made by government for rescue, containment, and cleanup,
citizens will harbor negative feelings toward the corporation for using up
these scarce community resources.132 These malevolent feelings are
often translated into hefty punitive damage awards for physical damages
caused, which surely deter and quite possibly overdeter, and to which
corporations are almost uniquely vulnerable.133 Indeed, protection of
128. See, e.g., Joseph R. Dancy, Electronic Media, Due Diligence, and the New
Industrial Revolution, 53 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 72, 80 (1999) (stating that if a
company has “a traditional insurance program like many other companies, chances are
the company has little or no coverage for the serious damage caused to its goodwill . . . .”).
129. Sidney G. Saltz, Allocation of Insurable Risks in Commercial Leases, 37 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479, 490 (2002) (“[M]any large companies self-insure risks of loss
to others caused by their negligence . . . .”); see also Douglas R. Richmond, SelfInsurance and the Decision to Settle, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 987, 996 (1994) (“Selfinsurance has become increasingly popular among commercial entities . . . .”).
130. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 142
(1974). Health insurance in particular creates numerous moral hazard problems. Mark
V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 535
(1968).
131. For example, after the Exxon Valdez disaster off the cost of Alaska in 1989,
consumer advocate Ralph Nader and several environmental groups called for a boycott
of the company. Philip Shabecoff, Six Groups Urge Boycott of Exxon, N.Y. TIMES, May
3, 1989, at A17.
132. In an era of global communication, anger about large industrial accidents need
not only be confined to communities located near the site of the disaster. For example,
after a pesticide plant leaked deadly chemicals in Bhopal, India in 1994, killing more
than 2000, Americans’ name recognition of Union Carbide, the majority shareholder of
the plant, increased greatly, as did negative feelings toward the company. Stuart
Jackson, Union Carbide’s Good Name Takes a Beating, BUS. WK., Dec. 31, 1984, at 40.
133. For example, Exxon was ordered to pay $4.5 billion in punitive damages for
the 1989 spill resulting from the grounding of the Valdez off the coast of Alaska. Susan
Beck, $1.3 Bil. in Fees Awarded in Exxon Valdez Litigation, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
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goodwill is one reason why corporations, though rarely individuals,
frequently voluntarily reimburse victims for damages they are not obliged to
pay in tort, as well as for damages suffered by third parties through no
fault of the corporation at all.134
It is reckless to assume, sans data, that corporations alone among
tortfeasors have insufficient incentive to prevent or limit the scope of
disasters. Unless a corporation is fly-by-night or insolvent, in which
case the abolition of FPSD would not affect anything, it will be sensitive
to reputational loss as well as to court ordered payments. Complex empirical
studies could determine whether the current net incentive, after fines,
punitive, and reputational “hits,” is in some sense “optimal” and, if it
is somehow “suboptimal,” whether this “suboptimality” is the result of
bankruptcy law, damages rules, insurance rules, agency problems resulting
from limited liability, or some other feature of American law. Without
such studies, the selective use of the deterrence rationale to justify abrogating
tort law’s FPSD, and for corporations only, is entirely unpersuasive.
B. Policy Reasons Why Public Services Are
Supplied by Governments
There is one policy question at which critics of FPSD sometimes hint,
but which they fail to substantially address: should governments supply
public services at zero marginal cost, whether the user is an individual or
a corporation? The answer to this question is a function of one’s view of
the proper role of government. For an extreme communitarian, all losses
are our losses, so they should perhaps all be borne by us. The “New
Mar. 9, 2004, at 5. This amount was reduced to $2.5 billion in In re Exxon Valdez, 472
F.3d 600, 625 (9th Cir. 2006). Overdeterrence in such a case might entail decisions
declining to ship oil.
134. Although the law was unclear as to whether manufacturers were liable for
injuries caused by criminal product tampering, in 1991 Johnson & Johnson settled with
the families of the seven Chicago-area residents who died nine years earlier after taking
Tylenol that had been laced with cyanide. Although few of the terms of settlement were
made public, they included college education funds for the eight children whose parents
had died in the tragedy. P. Davis Szymczak, Settlement Reached in Tylenol Suit, CHI.
TRIB., May 14, 1991, at 1. In the well-known case of Bolton v. Stone, a woman sued a
neighboring cricket club after being hit and injured while standing outside her home by a
ball that had strayed from the playing field. Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 1078 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from K.B.). One of the judges appeared surprised that, although legal
liability did not lie in tort because the accident was held to be unforeseeable, the
defendant club “offer[ed] no more consolation to his victim than the reflection that a
social being is not immune from social risks.” See id. at 1087.
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Zealand plan,” abolishing much of tort law to pay for accidents out of
the public treasury, reflects such a view.135 Alternatively, perhaps government
could be a subrogated insurer, a clearinghouse for corrective justice
transfers but an ultimate bearer of no losses itself whenever tortfeasors
are solvent. But should government be doing something that, say, State
Farm Insurance Co. can likely do more efficiently? These are important
questions for political philosophy and institutional economics, and
tangentially for tort theory as well. Surely such questions should be the
fulcrum of any critique of FPSD. Alas, critics of FPSD have not felt the
need to address them.
Government-provided protection in times of adversity surely spreads
costs, and corporations are not the only beneficiaries of this protection.
Corporations are, after all, economically a nexus of contracts among
individuals.136 Corporate employees, officers, and shareholders may all
be comforted knowing that government will be there to provide public
services when needed by the corporation, for which they will not be
billed afterward.137 If free public protection was extended only to
individuals, this modification of tort law would be equivalent to a tax
on the corporate form. FPSD critics fail to show why such a tax is
needed—they provide no evidence that total current corporate taxes are
too low. Maybe they are just right, or even, perhaps, too high.138

135. In the mid-1960s, the government of New Zealand commissioned a study of
the country’s workers’ compensation system. The Royal Commission was simply to make
suggestions with respect to workers’ compensation but instead ended up recommending
abolition of the tort system across the board. ROYAL COMM’N OF INQUIRY, COMPENSATION
FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN NEW ZEALAND 11, 12, 24, 26 (1967); Geoffrey W.R. Palmer &
Edward J. Lemons, Toward the Disappearance of Tort Law—New Zealand’s New
Compensation Plan, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 693, 739. Following the Royal Commission
study, in 1974, New Zealand enacted a no-fault accident compensation system to replace
tort remedies for accidents resulting in personal injuries. See Richard S. Miller, The
Future of New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme, 11 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 4
(1989) (describing the compensation scheme in New Zealand).
136. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 12, 15-17 (1991).
137. Lytton seems to want to make a public example of corporations experiencing
disasters. He admits that “[e]liminating the doctrine would encourage litigation—well
publicized in the case of industrial accidents—that portrays these losses as costs for
which someone must take responsibility.” Lytton, supra note 11, at 780.
138. In addition to those already mentioned, note that Galligan’s “public torts” are
directed at manufacturers. Galligan, Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public
Tort, supra note 11, at 1023. McIntyre focuses on large-scale disasters not typically
caused by individuals. McIntyre, supra note 11, at 1003.

28

KRAUSS.DOC

[VOL. 44: 1, 2007]

6/5/2007 1:39:30 PM

Public Services Meet Private Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Emergency services, often originally provided by private enterprise,139
have evolved to become proprietary government functions for reasons
that can be understood economically and philosophically. Economically,
government services sometimes have characteristics of public goods that
cannot be adequately provided privately.140 The production of emergency
services arguably generates pervasive benefits for which private providers
may be unable to charge. Like national security, the availability of
emergency services may benefit everyone in the community, whether
each individual pays for them or not. Providing such goods for some
necessarily means providing them for all.141 Economists refer to this
kind of externality as a “neighborhood effect.”142 Unless producers of
public goods can extract payments from every user of a service, each member
of the community has an incentive to free-ride on the willingness of
others to pay for them. No private producer will step in to satisfy a
general demand for such services because no producer can extract profits
from free-riding consumers. Spread across a community, neighborhood
effects and free riding can result in market failure, an unsatisfied demand
for a beneficial service. Government provision of this service, with tax
financing, is a response to this market failure.143
Philosophically, through the political process, we have resolved that
public funding of some services is just. Modern notions of the state
suggest that it is inappropriate to allow the market to determine who
receives vital services such as police and fire protection. Market distribution
of such services would arguably favor the wealthy and well organized at
the expense of the poor and helpless. The moral sensibilities of most
recoil at the suggestion that the poor should only receive substandard or

139. DAVID T. BEITO, FROM MUTUAL AID TO THE WELFARE STATE: FRATERNAL
SOCIETIES AND SOCIAL SERVICES, 1890-1967 (2000). In the seventeenth century, firefighting
was connected to fire insurance and was therefore privately provided. See Johnson,
supra note 85, at 406. The earliest public firefighting company in England was not
formed until 1866. Id. at 407. In colonial America, collective, mutual-assistance firefighting
companies predated private insurance. Private companies insuring against, as well as
fighting fires and reimbursing volunteer companies who fought fires on the property of
their insurance customers, arose in the mid-1700s. Id. at 414-17.
140. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
141. See 3 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 43-44 (1979).
142. See, e.g., David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 48 (2006).
143. See BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW 271-77 (1990); JAMES M.
BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY 46-50 (1975).
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unresponsive police or fire protection because they are “not willing” to
pay for more.
This understanding of a democratic resolution of the appropriateness
of free government provision of services appears to underlie the New
Jersey Superior Court’s eloquent opinion in City of Bridgeton v. B.P.
Oil, Inc.144 Granting defendants’ motion to dismiss a lawsuit by which a
city sought reimbursement for salaries it paid to contain an oil spill, the
court declared: “It has been stated that ‘It cannot be a tort for government to
govern.’ Neither is government a saleable commodity.”145 Calling
attention to the fact that fire protection had once been a private function,
the court affirmed that it was assuredly a government duty now.146 The
reason behind the transformation was explained the following way:
Governments, to paraphrase the Declaration of Independence, have been
instituted among men to do for the public good those things which the people
agree are best left to the public sector. Since our country was founded there has
developed a widening horizon of public activity. True, certain activities have
developed in areas from which revenue has been derived, such as turnpikes,
water or power supply, or postal services. Nevertheless, there remains an area
where the people as a whole absorb the cost of such services—for example the
prevention and detection of crime. No one expects the rendering of a bill (other
than a tax bill) if a policeman apprehends a thief. The services of fire fighters
are within this ambit and may not be billed as a public utility.
....
. . . [A] municipal corporation may not recover as damages the costs of its
governmental operations which it was created to perform . . . .
Thus, if the city were the owner of adjacent land damaged by escaping oil, it
like all landowners, may recover damages caused by this escape. It cannot,
however, recover costs incurred in fire protection or extinguishment. That is the
very purpose of government for which it was created.147

Bridgeton has proven influential, and for good cause.148 The idea that
the nature and functions of government are to be decided in the public
political arena, not through private law adjudication, is foundational to
FPSD. The Ninth Circuit conceded as much in City of Flagstaff v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway when it held that “the cost of
144. 369 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
145. Id. at 54 (quoting Amelchenko v. Freehold, 201 A.2d 726, 731 (N.J. 1964)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 54-55.
148. For example, the Declaration of Independence rationale in Bridgeton was
quoted in Mayor of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685, 688 (La. Ct.
App. 1984), and in City of Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., 512 A.2d 83, 84 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986). A few of the cases citing Bridgeton as a basis for their decisions
include: Township of Cherry Hill v. Conti Construction Co., 527 A.2d 921, 922 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 468 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y.
1984); and City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., Appeal Nos. C-990729, C-990814,
C-990815, 2000 WL 1133078 at *9 (Oh. Ct. App. 2000), rev’d, 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio
2002).
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public services for protection from fire or safety hazards is to be borne
by the public as a whole.”149 The court concluded:
Even if we were satisfied [which we are not] that we had the information to
choose the more efficient cost avoider in this case, . . . an added factor counsels
deference to the legislature. Here governmental entities themselves currently
bear the cost in question, and they have taken no action to shift it elsewhere. If
the government has chosen to bear the cost for reasons of economic efficiency,
or even as a subsidy to the citizens and their business, the decision implicates
fiscal policy; the legislature and its public deliberative processes, rather than the
court, is the appropriate forum to address such fiscal concerns.150

Cases like Bridgeton and Flagstaff reflect courts’ critical insight into
the differences between private and public law. Services that the
collectivity has chosen to provide are publicly funded goods until otherwise
decided in the political arena. Government can fund activities in various
ways: by instituting user fees, establishing lotteries, or imposing taxes,
including taxes on corporations if it is thought that they are not paying
their “fair share.” Criminals can be charged for the police work leading
to their arrest,151 or convicts can be charged a “hotel bill.”152 This all
happens through public ordering, the political process. Courts must not
shift these public costs as a common law function. To follow FPSD
opponents’ prescription would be to make an end run around the
political process and to engage in exactly the judicial regulation and
usurpation of tort law that Lytton, for one, purports to condemn.153

149. 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1983).
150. Id. at 323-24.
151. See, e.g., Window on State Government, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts,
Court Costs, Fees and Fines for Justice, County and District Courts, http://www.window.
state.tx.us/lga/courtcosts06/3.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2007) (describing fees for services
of peace officers, including arrest fees and warrant fees).
152. See, e.g., Mafia Boss Ordered to Pay Prison Costs, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 11,
2005, at A3 (“A federal judge Friday ordered the former head of the New England Mafia
to reimburse the government almost $120,000 for the cost of his eight years in prison.”);
Marla A. Goldberg, Suspect Denies Slaying Bruno, THE REPUBLICAN (Springfield,
Mass.), Dec. 28, 2005, at A1 (stating that two men convicted in federal court of interstate
travel in aid of a racketeering venture were ordered to pay about $31,000 to cover prison
costs).
153. See Lytton, supra note 11, at 780. The goal of the common law is corrective
justice, or righting wrongs between the parties at bar, not distributive justice, or ensuring
that the community’s resources are distributed in a just manner given political
considerations. See WEINRIB, supra note 87, at 204-31.
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C. Judicial Policymaking
It is in labeling the free public services doctrine judicial policymaking
that FPSD opponents make their definitive egregious error. Lytton calls
FPSD a “judicial invention,”154 but in fact courts that invoke the doctrine
see it as emblematic of judicial restraint.155 To cure the defects he sees
in FPSD, Lytton concludes that “[s]imply overturning [FPSD] . . . would
be justified, easy, and well within the legitimate powers of the courts.”156
Lytton thus promotes abandoning a common law rule intimately linked
to the distinction between private and public law.157 How can this be
done by a restrained court?158 Similarly, Wendy Wagner has argued that
gun litigation is a way of overcoming “stubborn” information problems
and reaping regulatory benefits not obtainable through the legislative
process.159 It is difficult to see what this has to do with judicial restraint,
the rule of law, or tort.
This wolf-in-sheep’s clothing approach, judicial legislation under the
guise of judicial restraint, may in fact characterize much of Professor
Lytton’s scholarship. Lytton has made radical, tort-transforming arguments
in support of suits against the firearms industry:
The military strategist Karl von Clausewitz asserted that war is a continuation of
politics by other means. The same might be said of gun litigation.
....
. . . I . . . recognize the appropriateness of more focused legislative responses to
litigation, where legislatures disagree with the policy implications of particular
judicial decisions.
....
. . . [But the] legislature should [disagree] in a restrained way, one that respects
the preeminence of courts in shaping tort doctrine and preserves the regulatory
benefits of tort litigation. . . . [M]ore focused responses promote the integrity of
tort doctrine, respect the separation of powers, and preserve a regulatory role for
the courts.160

154. Lytton, supra note 11, at 780.
155. See, e.g., City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49, 54 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1976) (“It has been stated that ‘It cannot be a tort for government to govern.’”)
(quoting Amelchenko v. Freehold, 201 A.2d 726, 731 (1964)).
156. Lytton, supra note 11, at 780.
157. See Krauss, supra note 25, at 653-54.
158. In fact, Lytton dislikes FPSD so much that he is apparently indifferent as to
just which party—the courts or the legislature—should take the lead in ending it. He
argues at one point that judges should abolish the doctrine, leaving the legislature free to
reestablish it by statute if desired, and at another that the doctrine “should be replaced
with a statutory scheme that generally allows government to sue in tort for public service
expenditures subject to specific exceptions.” Lytton, supra note 11, at 780.
159. See Wendy Wagner, Stubborn Information Problems and the Regulatory Benefits
of Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 15, at 271-72.
160. LYTTON, The NRA, the Brady Campaign, and the Politics of Gun Litigation, in
SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 15, at 152-53, 170.
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Furthermore, Lytton argues that “courts should play a secondary role in
policy-making that complements the regulatory efforts of legislatures
and administrative agencies.”161
IV. GENERAL CRITICISMS OF THE FREE PUBLIC SERVICES DOCTRINE:
FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS AND COMPARISONS
This Article has heretofore taken on the arguments employed by the
critics of FPSD. It is now time to pass from the defense to the offense.
FPSD criticism, it turns out, is biased, inefficient, and unprincipled.
A. What’s Incorporation Got to Do with It?
Dean Prosser described FPSD thus: “The state never can sue in tort in
its political or governmental capacity, although as the owner of property
it may resort to the same tort actions as any individual proprietor to
recover for injuries to the property, or to recover the property itself.”162
So FPSD is not, on its face, confined to damages caused by corporate
tortfeasors.
Yet in the introduction to his argument against FPSD, Lytton affirms
that “[t]he doctrine shields industrial tortfeasors from liability for
cleanup costs, passing those costs on to the public. It constitutes a tort
subsidy to industry and functions as an insurance scheme for industrial
accidents . . . .”163 He elsewhere pronounces that, “[i]n many instances,
the doctrine lets industrial tortfeasors off the hook for forest fires, oil
spills, and airline crashes and makes taxpayers pay the cleanup
costs,”164 and that FPSD is an “undesirable tort subsidy to careless
industries . . . .”165 Lytton flatly charges courts that have applied the

161. LYTTON, The Complementary Role of Tort Litigation in Regulating the Gun
Industry, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 15, at 250.
162. KEETON ET AL., supra note 26, § 2, at 7. Prosser describes an underlying rule
of tort, although he does not explicitly label it as the free public services doctrine.
Prosser notes that the rule governs municipal corporations as well as states. Id. at n.3.
Lytton’s refusal to recognize this underlying rule is what leads him to conclude that only
ten states recognize the doctrine; other states simply decline to use the label. See, e.g.,
County of Champaign v. Anthony, 337 N.E.2d 87, 87-88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (quoting
Prosser in affirming dismissal of county’s lawsuit against criminal defendant for cost of
protecting witness who testified against him at trial).
163. Lytton, supra note 11, at 730 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 781 (emphasis added).
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doctrine with “pro-industry bias.”166 Relying on these arguments, a
recent New Jersey decision refused to apply FPSD to reject a city’s suit
against a gun manufacturer because of the “unfairness” of allowing
corporate tortfeasors to use public services the same way that private
citizens do.167
Anti-FPSD articles refer overwhelmingly to corporate defendants such
as chemical companies,168 railroads,169 and firearm manufacturers.170 But
166. Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
167. James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 48-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
168. For example, in Lytton, supra note 11, at 729 n.2, Lytton cites to: Kodiak
Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1999) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant oil company in suit by cities to recover costs for cleanup of
Exxon Valdez oil spill); Mayor of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685
(La. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding judgment for city for property damage resulting from
chemical fire, but denying recovery for costs to city of fighting the fire); City of
Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (affirming
denial of recovery for costs incurred by municipal fire department in containing oil
spill); and City of Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., 512 A.2d 83 (Pa. Commonw. Ct.
1986) (affirming dismissal of city suit to recover costs of deploying police to the scene
of gas pipeline explosion). In Lytton, supra note 11, at 729 n.3, Lytton cites to In re Oil
Spill (Amoco Cadiz), 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding liability of oil and
shipbuilding companies for oil spill at sea).
169. In Lytton, supra note 11, at 729 n.2, Lytton cites Town of Howard v. Soo Line
R.R. Co., 217 N.W.2d 329 (Wis. 1974) (reversing summary judgment to plaintiff town
for recovery of firefighting costs resulting from railroad negligence). In Lytton, supra
note 11, at 729 n.3, he cites: City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway
Co., 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming summary judgment for railroad in suit by
city for recovery of emergency costs expended following derailment); Allenton
Volunteer Fire Department v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 372 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Wis. 1974)
(dismissing fire department’s suit to recover costs of fighting fires caused by defendant
railroad); United States v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 547 F.2d 1101
(10th Cir. 1977) (allowing recovery for firefighting costs and damage to federal land
negligently caused by defendant railroad, but disallowing recovery for overhead of
firefighting program); United States v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 130 F.2d 308 (4th Cir.
1942) (reversing dismissal of suit against negligent railroad to recover costs for fire
suppression in national forest); and United States v. Illinois Terminal Railroad Co., 501
F. Supp. 18 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (denying railroad’s motion to dismiss suit by government to
recover costs for removal of abandoned bridge piers).
170. In Lytton, supra note 11, at 729 n.5, Lytton cites City of Philadelphia v.
Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (dismissing city’s and civic
organizations’ negligence and public nuisance claims against gun manufacturer for
expenses incurred as a result of gun violence), aff’d, 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002); Ganim
v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. X06 CV 990153198S, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3330
(Dec. 10, 1999), aff’d, 780 A.2d 98, 108 (Conn. 2001) (affirming dismissal of public
nuisance suit by mayor and city against gun manufacturers and distributors for costs
incurred related to gun violence); Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc., No. 99-1941 CA-06,
1999 WL 1204353 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999) (dismissing with prejudice suit of
Miami-Dade County against gun manufacturers to recover costs of emergency services
provided in response to gun violence); and City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
Appeal Nos. C-990729, C-990814, C-990815, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3601, at *1 (Ct.
App. 2000) (affirming dismissal of city’s lawsuit to recover from gun distributor and
manufacturers the costs of emergency services arising from gun violence), rev’d, 768
N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002) (affirming municipalities may not generally expect to recover
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what’s incorporation got to do with this problem? Much government
assistance targets individual victims who have either negligently caused
their own peril or who have been injured by other culpable individuals.
From Coast Guard rescue of careless boaters to welfare benefits for
single mothers to helicopter hoistings of those who choose not to
evacuate, government rescue is at least as much a response to individual
misfortune as to corporate tort.
Perhaps FPSD opponents believe that courts only invoke FPSD in
suits filed by governments against large, financially solvent corporations
for recoupment of rescue costs, but this is not the case. Governmental
entities rarely attempt to recoup the cost of services from individual
tortfeasors, likely both because of limits on solvency and because of
reluctance to sue one’s own voters in tort; but this political reality does
not affect the content of the underlying tort doctrine. A solvent (insured)
individual’s negligence can certainly result in the expenditure of
thousands or even millions of dollars of public rescue services. In 1987,
a small Texas town spared no expense to save a child who had fallen
down an abandoned well because of negligent parental supervision, and
though there was no evidence that the parents were unable to pay for her
rescue, no reimbursement was ever sought.171 Nor is it clear that those
who stand behind individual tortfeasors are incapable of indemnifying
fire departments when careless smoking sets homes ablaze. In 2002, a
federal forest service employee carelessly burned a letter at a campground
in a National Forest, resulting in $52 million in losses; her wealthy
government employer could have reimbursed local firefighters under
respondeat superior.172 The apocryphal insured motorist who negligently
caused an accident on the George Washington Bridge during rush hour
costs of services from tortfeasors’ harm to public but creating an exception for “ongoing
and persistent” misconduct).
171. The mother and aunt of Jessica McClure, who fell down a well in her aunt’s
backyard in Midland, Texas in 1987, were determined by the state human services
agency to have been negligently supervising the girl at the time of the accident.
Associated Press, Report Criticizes 2 Relatives in Child’s Fall in Texas Well, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1988, at A18. If the McClure family did not at the time have sufficient
resources to pay for the rescue services received, it certainly did after the event was over.
A $1 million trust fund was formed for Jessica’s benefit from donations received from
people around the world who learned of her ordeal in the media. Chip Brown, ‘Baby
Jessica’ Adapts to Living Normal Life as a First-Grader, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1992, at
A1.
172. Howard Pankratz, Government May Be Liable: Federal Worker’s Role in Fire
Opens Legal Avenues, Experts Say, DENVER POST, June 18, 2002, at A6.
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may in fact have enough coverage to pay for the huge outlay of state
police overtime services to re-route traffic. But of course, motorists are
never sued by governments to recoup these expenses, and this failure to
sue is appropriate because recoupment suits have no basis in tort law.
FPSD opponents never explain why tort law should treat corporations
differently.
One possible distinction between corporate and individual demands on
services is that it would be inefficient to encourage small recoupment
claims against individuals, and that for this reason only significant
corporate wrongdoing should set off an exception to FPSD. But Lytton
himself points out that governments have occasionally launched
(unsuccessful) tort suits to recoup small sums from corporations.173 For
instance, in 1986 Pittsburgh sued Equitable Gas Company for $1185.70
in public expenditures following a natural gas explosion.174 In 1987 the
affluent Township of Cherry Hill, New Jersey, sued Conti Construction
in a vain effort to recover $4220.80, the estimated cost of police
overtime pay to evacuate a neighborhood after a Conti employee
negligently ruptured a gas line.175 In 1984, the State of New York
unsuccessfully sued the Long Island Lighting Company for $5263.18 in
expenses incurred to divert traffic from a stretch of road onto which
power lines had negligently been allowed to fall.176 Governments arguably
choose to sue corporations for small sums, as opposed to individual
citizens, for political reasons, not for efficiency reasons.
Are these small-scale lawsuits rational? Why would New York State,
Pittsburgh, or Cherry Hill take a company to court to recover a small
amount of money, surely less money than it costs to file and prosecute
the claims? In addition to the obvious public choice explanation for this
phenomenon,177 two other possible justifications for these suits come to
mind. Perhaps local and state governments have an “all shoplifters will
be prosecuted” policy; that is, perhaps they try to take all public-serviceincurring tortfeasors to court, no matter the value of the claim, as a
deterrent to negligent action causing governmental loss. Alternatively,
government entities may be attempting to make an example out of a
173. All three cases discussed here, infra text accompanying notes 174-76, are cited
by Lytton, supra note 11, at 729 n.2.
174. City of Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., 512 A.2d 83, 84 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986).
175. Twp. of Cherry Hill v. Conti Constr. Co., 527 A.2d 921, 922 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1987).
176. New York v. Long Island Lighting Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256 (N.Y.Co. Ct.
1985).
177. Companies cannot vote; company money is “new money” brought into government
coffers, and replaces individual tax dollars, thereby allowing for a lessened tax load on
those who do vote.
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particular defendant, perhaps because prior unsatisfactory behavior has
demonstrated that this company is a “bad apple.” But neither of these
possible justifications can be easily reconciled with the fact that governments’
tort lawyers seemingly ignore claims on their resources by individual
tortfeasors, many of whom are surely known to be generally bad citizens.
Another argument possibly distinguishing individual from corporate
beneficiaries of public services is that the former create problems the
state is meant to resolve, while the latter cause “excessive” harm beyond
the legitimate scope of free public services. McIntyre writes that “as a
practical matter it would not be cost effective for a government entity to
entangle itself in an expensive lawsuit for the relatively small costs
incurred in responding to minor emergencies such as car crashes and
small home fires that are not properly characterized as disasters.”178
Under this rationale, corporations are different from physical persons,
and deserve distinctive tort treatment, essentially because they are not
citizens. Judgments from New Jersey and Massachusetts have alluded to
an alleged public policy rationale behind spreading the risk of emergency
services away from individual persons, stating that “it would be too
burdensome to charge all who carelessly cause or fail to prevent fires
with the injuries suffered by the expert retained with public funds to deal
with those inevitable, although negligently created, occurrences.”179 In
essence, this argument is that efficiency requires collective sharing of
losses caused by individuals, but not corporations. This conclusion
reinforces the impression that those who defend municipal cost recovery
suits are more concerned with transferring resources from corporations
to governments than with the theory of FPSD itself.
The preoccupation with corporate liability leads Lytton to argue that
FPSD “unjustifiably favors tortfeasors who harm government as
compared to those who harm private parties.” 180 If a corporation
negligently damages a private party’s property through, for example, an
oil spill, the corporation will be liable in tort for the damage caused to
that party.181 But if the same negligent corporate actor “harms” the
government by “requiring” it to expend money to deploy emergency
178. McIntyre, supra note 11, at 1018 n.102.
179. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 527 A.2d at 922 (quoting Krauth v. Geller, 157 A.2d 129,
131 (N.J. 1960)). This quotation was also cited in City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., No. 1999-02590, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352, at *33 (Super. Ct. July 13, 2000).
180. Lytton, supra note 11, at 759.
181. Id. at 760.
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equipment and cleanup crews to the private party’s home, the corporation is
not liable to the government, a result Lytton believes is unfair and
irrational.182 The mistake here should be obvious from the first part of
this Article. The harm the individual suffers in Lytton’s first example is
direct, not mediated as is the public service expense in helping clean up
the individual’s property. Lytton concedes that directly harmed public
property will also be indemnified in tort: if the negligent oil spill
pollutes City Hall, the city will recover damages from the spiller under
current tort law.183 No discrimination in favor of corporations is involved
here. The “problem” here is not FPSD, it is tort law’s proximate causation
requirement, and as discussed above, this is a non-problem.
Instead of comparing the potential liability of a corporate tortfeasor
that has directly harmed a private plaintiff with a corporate tortfeasor
that has indirectly harmed government, a logical study would compare
the fate of a corporate tortfeasor that has indirectly harmed government
with an individual tortfeasor who has similarly indirectly harmed
government. Under the anti-FPSD rationale employed by the New Jersey
Superior Court in James v. Arms Tech. Inc.,184 a chemical company
whose plant explodes due to its negligence should be liable for the costs
of deployment of the municipal fire department to extinguish the
blaze.185 Bubt a negligent homeowner who requires the services of the
same fire department after falling asleep while smoking is not liable for
firefighting costs.186 Yet, to paraphrase the court, given the existence of
a “repeated course of conduct on [the part of smokers], requiring [a
municipality] to expend substantial governmental funds on a continuous
basis,” why the disparity?187
The cost incurred by a municipality in extinguishing a given fire is not
a function of the corporate status of the fire setter. As noted above, it
might not be cost effective for the government to attempt to recover
from every homeowner. But governments regularly devote considerable
182. See id. At least the corporation would not be liable for the emergency costs.
Lytton acknowledges that negligent tortfeasors may be required to repay governments
for damage to real or chattel property. Id. at 743.
183. Id.
184. 820 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
185. See id. at 41-43. Lytton states: “Getting rid of the doctrine would allow
government entities to recover from tortfeasors the costs of services such as fire
suppression, environmental cleanup, and rescue operations.” Lytton, supra note 11, at
768.
186. As Lytton believes that eliminating the free public services doctrine with
regard to corporations “would not open the door to unlimited liability or unleash a flood
of claims,” id. at 750, he presumably envisions allowing government suits to recover
only the costs of the relatively large emergency expenditures typically caused by corporations,
rather than the more numerous, lesser costs of services provided to negligent individuals.
187. James, 820 A.2d at 48-49.

38

KRAUSS.DOC

[VOL. 44: 1, 2007]

6/5/2007 1:39:30 PM

Public Services Meet Private Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

resources to the profitable collection of very small sums of money, such
as traffic fines, from individuals. In the aggregate, small, routine rescues
of individuals, such as sending out fire trucks for negligently caused
automobile accidents, may well absorb the lion’s share of a fire company’s
budget and time.188 Imagine that a homeowner negligently damages his
natural gas line, resulting in an explosion that causes neighboring houses
to catch fire. This homeowner would be liable to his neighbors under
current tort doctrine,189 yet would not be pursued by the municipality for
the costs of extinguishing the blaze.190 Is this “unfair”? Opponents of
FPSD do not seem to think so. Why are free public services unfair only
when the tortfeasor is a corporation?
Stripped of anti-corporate bias, the real question is whether it is unjust
that a tortfeasor be held liable for direct but not for mediated damages.
Should there be a point at which corporations and individuals should be
liable for expenditures by a fire department, perhaps if an unusually
large number of firefighters, as compared to the number required to
douse an “average” fire, must respond to a call? Should it matter that a
government provides these services as a service, not a subsidy, to all
legitimate (corporate and individual) stakeholders in society?191 An
188. Consider the experience of park rangers in Yosemite National Park. While
rescuing mountain climbers is quite costly due to the equipment and training required,
the number of such rescues is only about fifteen percent of the total number of rescues
each year. The vast majority of search and rescue missions are for lost hikers, a comparatively
cheap task per rescue. According to a ranger, “[c]limber rescues are more expensive
because of helicopters, but we do spend more money rescuing hikers.” Clare Noonan,
Rescuing Climbers Raises Questions of Who Should Pay, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July
21, 2002, at C7.
189. But see Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 211-12 (1866) (stating that
the party negligently causing a fire is liable for damage only to the closest building to
which the fire spreads, not all buildings that may be damaged); Pa. R.R. Co. v. Kerr, 62
Pa. 353 (1870) (holding a railroad may be liable for fire damage directly caused by
sparks from a passing train, but that additional damage resulting from the fire spreading
from building to building was not recoverable). The Supreme Court noted in Milwaukee
& Saint Paul Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474 (1876), that Ryan and Kerr “have
been the subject of much criticism since they were decided” and that the rule they stood
for had not been widely accepted.
190. Negligently caused forest fires may be an exception to this trend in that
individuals, as well as companies, are apparently sometimes billed or sued for reimbursement
for fire suppression expenses. Ted Cilwick, Cost of Fighting Fires in Wild Sparks Bills
for Reimbursement, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1990, at A5.
191. Though most agree that the government should provide services to citizens,
many feel that these services should not be extended to illegal immigrants. An example
of this sentiment is California Proposition 187, passed in 1994. The proposition demanded
that the state withhold many social services, including public education and emergency
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anarcho-capitalistic argument could be made for eliminating government
services,192 but FPSD opponents do not seem motivated by anarchocapitalist theories.
B. Flawed Distributional Claims
FPSD critics seem to feel that the doctrine unfairly acts as liability
insurance for corporations, insurance for which “industry tends to get far
more risk reduction and pay proportionally less for it than average
citizens.”193 Lytton calls this system “distributively unfair”194 and claims,
without marshalling any data to support his position, that “citizens are
cross-subsidizing industry.”195 The alleged subsidization occurs because
corporate taxes are not experience rated—there is no direct relationship
between the taxes paid by corporations and risks created by these
corporations.196
Lytton does concede, in passing, that corporations are required to
finance, through corporate and property taxes, public services from which
they are unable to benefit, such as public education and welfare benefits.197
But he dismisses these instances of industry-to-individual “subsidization” as
unworthy of his attention, because they are “products of legislative
decisions, not tort subsidies created by common law judges.”198 Though
this type of subsidy “may be just as distributively unfair as the free public
services doctrine’s cross-subsidization of industry by citizens,” Lytton
opines that the legislature’s blessing bestows upon these “subsidies” “a
level of democratic legitimacy.”199

room care, from illegal immigrants. Though the proposition passed by almost a 2-1
margin, federal courts restrained implementation. Gregorio T. ex rel Jose T. v. Wilson,
59 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1995). A recently-passed Georgia law has been compared to
California Proposition 187. See Rick Lyman, Georgia Immigration Law Broad,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 14, 2006, at A3 (describing the recently passed law that will
take effect on July 1, 2007, and that will deny state benefits, including welfare and
Medicaid, to those who cannot prove they are in the country legally).
192. See generally DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM: A GUIDE TO
RADICAL CAPITALISM (2d ed. Open Court 1989) (1973); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A
NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO (rev. ed. Collier Books 1978) (1973).
193. Lytton, supra note 11, at 764-65.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Obviously, if a municipality’s expenses rose greatly because of an accident, a
hike in taxes might be required, and if a corporation pays a significant percentage of the
municipality’s taxes, that corporation will bear the costs of this tax increase. But the
municipality will not be allowed to increase the taxes of the corporation alone. Allowing
a discriminatory tax hike is, in essence, the gist of Lytton’s proposal.
197. Lytton, supra note 11, at 764-65.
198. Id. at 765.
199. Id.
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Like other taxpayers, corporations pay income taxes used in part for
transfer payments. Corporations pay property taxes that fund many municipal
services to individuals.200 Corporations pay other taxes for which they
directly recoup little, such as Social Security and unemployment levies.
Indeed, corporations are believed to generate, directly and indirectly, so
many positive tax externalities that local governments compete to entice
them to relocate to their communities. State and municipal “tax holidays”
may be strong circumstantial corroboration that corporations provide net
positive tax externalities ex ante.201
Tellingly, in a footnote Lytton makes an important concession that
undermines his argument that FPSD is illegitimate corporate welfare.
He writes: “Empirical data comparing public expenditures occasioned by
industry to public expenditures occasioned by individuals is unavailable.
Thus, claims of cross-subsidization are admittedly speculative. Such
claims are, however, not unlikely given the relatively higher risk
posed by industrial accidents when compared to accidents caused by
individuals.”202 It turns out that his “subsidization” claim is based on
social costs (the cost of industrial accidents), but not on social benefits
(the positive neighborhood effects attributable to the corporation) that
result from the operation of a company. Speculating that FPSD results
in a net subsidy to corporations, without looking at the benefits of the
corporate form, is academic “junk social science.”203

200. Corporations pay property taxes even though these are considered to be mostly
“benefits based,” that is, the benefits received by the taxpayer in exchange for taxes paid
are allegedly relatively closely related. See HERBERT KIESLING, TAXATION AND PUBLIC
GOODS 182 (1992). Property taxes are often the single largest source of revenue for
cities. This is so, for example, for New York City, which received 40% of its budget
from property taxes in fiscal year 2002. CITY OF N.Y. DEP’T OF FINANCE OFFICE OF TAX
POLICY, ANNUAL REPORT ON TAX EXPENDITURES FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 5, http://home2.
nyc.gov/html/dof/htm1/pdf/01pdf/taxexpend_02.pdf.
201. See, e.g., Peter Behr, To Lure Jobs, States Surrender Key Tax Returns, WASH.
POST, Aug. 20, 1995, at A1; Peralte C. Paul, Big Push Won DaimlerChrysler Political
Cooperation, Site Deal Seen as Keys to Securing Plant, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 20,
2002, at F1; Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, States in No-Holds-Barred Battle to Attract New
Jobs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 31, 1995, at 3.
202. Lytton, supra note 11, at 764 n.177 (emphasis added).
203. Under the standard of evidence laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, “in order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion
must be derived by the scientific method.” 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). The factors used
by a court to determine if evidence is admissible as scientific or technical knowledge
include whether the knowledge has been or can be tested, whether the methodology at
issue has been subject to peer review and publication, and whether the technique used to
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C. Flawed Allocative Claim
It turns out that the distributive argument for revocation of FPSD is
gratuitous speculation. Not to worry, for FPSD critics are capable of
changing tack completely to promote corporate tort liability for public
services as allocatively efficient loss spreading, unlike municipal
taxation which constitutes inefficient, compulsory insurance.204 Lytton
writes:
[W]hen government passes public service costs on to taxpayers, they are not
free to opt out of the insurance scheme. As long as government finances public
services, the free public services doctrine will compel taxpayers to participate in
a loss-spreading scheme that insures against liability for the cost of public
services.205

There are two problems with this poor imitation of Judge Posner.
First, it impliedly excludes corporations from the category of taxpayers.
As noted, this exclusion is groundless since no data supports the contention
that corporate taxpayers are not similarly or even more acutely impoverished
by coercive “group insurance” of publicly financed services. Secondly,
without full fee-for-service privatization of all social services, which
FPSD critics neither advocate nor support, some will always pay more,
others less, than their fair share for public services.206 It is the essence of
a tax that its payment be coercive. It can be argued that a corporate
citizen that has never suffered an accidental fire, explosion, chemical
spill, or other large scale disaster is “inefficiently” subsidizing paramedic,
fire, and police insurance for the small minority of individuals who
consume the majority of EMTs’, fire departments’, and police forces’
time. But such an argument would be specious, because it is unclear
what “inefficiently” means in this context. Why is payment of “forced
insurance” by corporations not “inefficient” to FPSD opponents? They
do not provide any theory of efficiency or of politics that would explain
why a net payment in one direction, but not in the other, is “inefficient.”
Nor do they ever discuss the communitarian premises which arguably
underlie the notion of public services. Communitarian ideals might in
fact compel general payment of “natural monopoly” public goods,

acquire the knowledge is generally accepted. Id. at 593-94. Lytton’s discussion on
subsidization would not pass such a test.
204. Lytton, supra note 11, at 763.
205. Id. at 764.
206. Even privatized and fully competitive insurance markets will result in unequal
distribution of costs and benefits ex post, though of course not ex ante if premiums are
actuarially set.
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trumping any efficiency claim.207 Is it “inefficient” for the majority to
pay for police protection of an embattled minority that frequently needs
police protection yet does not pay its fair share? Without discussion of
such issues as equal protection, due process and republican form of
government issues, arguments against FPSD on grounds of efficient
insurance are anarcho-libertarian whistles in the dark.
D. Voluntary Products Liability “Insurance” vs. Involuntary
Public Services “Insurance”
Noting that “[l]oss spreading elsewhere in the law of torts involves
voluntary participation of those in the risk pool,”208 FPSD opponents
contrast the “voluntary” insurance scheme resulting from corporate
liability for defective products with the “involuntary” loss spreading
required by payment of public services through taxes. For example,
Lytton asserts that under products liability, “the cost of purchasing the
insurance is included in the price of the product,” which makes the
insurance voluntary.209 “By contrast,” Lytton claims, “when government
passes public service costs on to taxpayers, they are not free to opt out of
the insurance scheme.”210
This astounding comparison misunderstands both the nature of public
services and the insurance element of products liability law, which is
“voluntary” in a most unusual way. Consumers may not currently give
up their rights to sue manufacturers in products liability in exchange for
lower prices; they may “opt out” of products liability “insurance” only
by refusing to buy the products themselves, a virtual impossibility for
some goods and a very inefficient bundling for most others.211 Similarly,
producers may opt out of product liability law only by ceasing to
produce, not by offering less insurance in return for a lower price. In
addition, when products are purchased, all purchasers pay the same
“insurance premium” as a component of the product price, regardless of
the individual risk created by each consumer’s particular use of the
207. See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 140, at 320-23 (noting that allowing individuals
in a community to opt out of “equal sharing” of the restrictions and burdens of the
community might change the character of the community).
208. Lytton, supra note 11, at 763.
209. Id. at 764.
210. Id.
211. See Michael I. Krauss, Product Liability and Game Theory: One More Trip to
the Choice-of-Law Well, 2002 BYU L. REV. 759, 802-15.
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product.212 This is exactly the same “involuntary” “cross-subsidizing”
that Lytton believes is unjustly generated by FPSD.213 Bundling is
bundling, for private or for public services. Taxpayers can decide to fund
more or less services through tax dollars, or they can refuse to fund services
at all, leaving them to the private market. Taxpayers can move to another
jurisdiction with different tax preferences, or they can decline to earn
income (avoiding income tax) or purchase goods (avoiding sales tax). In
neither product liability law nor public finance is there a “clean” insurance
market with individually determined and agreed-upon premiums for
specific risks. In the end, the involuntary nature of FPSD matters if and
only if public provision of rescue services is itself fundamentally unjust.214
FPSD opponents declare that the doctrine is an inefficient way to
provide insurance, and that “[e]liminating the doctrine would encourage
most high-risk entities to purchase private insurance.”215 This implies
that companies do not currently purchase enough insurance because they
expect FPSD to protect them from liability in the event of a negligentlycaused disaster. As a matter of fact, insurance coverage is specifically
mentioned in several of the cases cited by FPSD opponents. For example,
after the oil tanker Cadiz ran aground in 1978, Amoco’s insurance
company told the French government that it could not on its own handle
the cleanup of such a large oil spill, but that the company would
reimburse France for “reasonable costs” incurred by France in the
cleanup on Amoco’s behalf.216 Following the terms of an international
convention on pollution damage to which France was a party, Amoco
paid the maximum recovery amount for such incidents—77 million
Francs (about $16 million)—into a fund for the French government to
apply toward cleanup costs.217 The French government, however, thought
this sum insufficient and sued (in American courts, bien sûr) to obtain
additional funds.218 It is hard to see why it should be assumed that
Amoco was underinsured when the company made arrangements to pay
212. Some consumers use their ladders daily, others only once a year. Additionally,
some users are risk averse while others are reckless. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 88-92 (1972) (discussing relation of liability rules to level
of care exercised by consumers).
213. Lytton, supra note 11, at 764.
214. Lytton’s argument about corporations not paying their fair share for rescue
services becomes even less intelligible when one considers that corporations do not
actually pay taxes. In fact, the cost of corporate taxes is passed on to employees in the
form of lower wages, or corporate shareholders in the form of lower dividends. See, e.g.,
MARIAN KRZYZANIAK & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE SHIFTING OF THE CORPORATION
INCOME TAX (1963).
215. Lytton, supra note 11, at 765.
216. In re Oil Spill (Amoco Cadiz), 954 F.2d 1279, 1310 (7th Cir. 1992).
217. Id.
218. Id.

44

KRAUSS.DOC

6/5/2007 1:39:30 PM

Public Services Meet Private Law

[VOL. 44: 1, 2007]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the statutory maximum allowed for such a disaster. If the statutory
maximum was insufficient, that cap, not tort law’s free public services
doctrine, needs to be changed.
Insurance coverage was also an issue in Fontenot.219 The two
corporations involved in the explosion and fire “stipulated liability, not
to exceed the limits of liability in the applicable insurance policies.”220
Although defendants had policies at various coverage levels with five
different insurance companies, the city chose to sue only the two firms
from which the insureds had purchased “excess coverage.”221 The court
explained the move this way: “Apparently, the limits of liability of the
other insurers had been expended in satisfaction of other claims.”222 If
that was the case, it can hardly be argued that the defendants had
inadequate insurance; after all, they had not themselves exhausted the
limits of liability on all of their policies. Rather, the city seemed to want
to convert the insured’s “excess coverage” into social insurance, so long
as the money came from an outside insurer and not a local firm.
V. CONCLUSION
FPSD opponents maintain that the free public services doctrine “does
not have particularly deep roots in the common law, dating back only to
the 1970s.”223 As this Article has demonstrated, FPSD is in fact an
ancient doctrine. What opponents see as antecedents to FPSD—cases
involving unsuccessful tort claims against criminals for the cost of their
capture and imprisonment,224 or failed suits by the federal government
to recover economic losses resulting from injury by a tortfeasor to
soldiers,225—are in fact, like FPSD, nothing but particular applications
of duty, proximate cause, and economic harm theories.
This Article has situated FPSD as a sound and timeless application of
common law doctrines. Those who oppose FPSD resort to policy analysis
motivated by an inchoate and uninformed bias against corporations.
Their claim that FPSD “inefficiently externalizes the costs of tortfeasors’
219.
1984).
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Mayor of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685 (La. Ct. App.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 686-87 & n.1.
Id. at 687 n.2.
Lytton, supra note 11, at 731.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 735-36.
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wrongdoing”226 fails, as does their assertion that the doctrine is “distributively
unfair.”227 Their conclusion that “[a]bandoning the doctrine would end
an undesirable tort subsidy to careless industries and place an appropriate
limit on judicial loss spreading . . .”228 is untenable.229
This Article has defended FPSD from the unjust accusation that it
represents judicial activism. Critics fail to explain why judges’ application
of traditional common law doctrines of duty and proximate causation is
activism, while judicial overthrow of these doctrines on speculative policy
grounds and in the name of an inchoate efficiency would not be activism.
In fact, such a dramatic upheaval would be aberrant for the common law.
Common law judges should examine issues before them without
preconceived ideas about launching policy “reform” efforts when the
right case comes along.230
The free public services doctrine is a brick mortared to the walls of the
proximate causation, duty, and economic loss rules. Its critics fail to see
the doctrine’s intrinsic link to the common law of tort. The failings of
their arguments give us reason to applaud, not to condemn, the free
public services doctrine.

226. Id. at 731.
227. Id. at 764.
228. Id. at 780-81.
229. See Krauss, supra note 25, at 625-30; see also WEINRIB, supra note 87, at 3-6.
He recognizes that, although economic and other functional approaches to tort law have
“an understandable appeal,” nonetheless
What the functionalist offers is not so much a theory of private law as a theory
of social goals into which private law may or may not fit.
. . . The functionalist is concerned with whether the results of cases promote
the postulated goals. Private law, however, is more than the sum of its results.
Id.
230. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643
(1996) (arguing that the common law role consists largely of finding community norms,
applying structural tests to these norms, and enforcing the norms that pass the test).

46

